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Editorial

PASTORS AND TEACHERS

JUST a year ago, in an editorial entitled "The *Canadian Journal of Theology*: Retrospect and Prospect," we tried to state in a few hundred words some of the many things we had in mind in planning the early volumes of the *Journal*. Among other points, we noted that we intended to produce a journal of *theology*, which would both focus attention on the abiding truth of God's revelation and bring that truth to bear on the problems of the Church in the modern world. We disclaimed any thought of engaging in elaborate technical discussions of the history or the logic of theology, important as such discussions are, in the final analysis, for the integrity and clarity of Christian thinking and speaking. What we did want to do, we said, was to hold up the truth of God, interpreted and presented with all the resources at our disposal, as the standard of Christian understanding and Christian action. By this intention we stand.

It is one thing, however, to see a target, and quite another thing to hit it, and we are only too well aware of unfulfilled intentions and unsolved problems. More especially, as we begin our seventh volume, we are conscious of a partial failure, at least, to meet the felt needs of many parish priests and ministers. On this point, any lack of sensitivity in our own corporate conscience has been compensated for by the friendly frankness of a number of pastors. We candidly admit that we have failed to provide a steady supply of certain commodities which might reasonably have been expected from us and which, indeed, it has been our declared intention to offer. Of course, we cannot print what has not been written, and if our store of biblical expositions is often empty and our file of studies of particular pastoral problems almost non-existent, the explanation is simple: with certain notable exceptions, our Canadian biblical scholars have done little to help us bring contemporary biblical studies to the aid of the men who must preach God's Word in our pulpits week in and week out, while those very pastors who put such an unerring finger on our editorial weaknesses are strangely diffident when it comes to sharing their own experience and insights with our readers. But we do not want to excuse ourselves by pointing to the failures of others. However good the reasons may seem, we know that we have not yet achieved a great many things whose importance we acknowledge.

At the same time, perhaps we may be permitted to wonder out loud whether pastors always make full use of what we do manage to provide—

and whether, where they do not, one reason may not be a failure to appreciate one very important aspect of the pastoral office in the modern world.

> His gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, for the equipment of the saints, for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ, until we all attain to the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ; so that we may no longer be children, tossed to and fro and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the cunning of men, by their craftiness in deceitful wiles [Ephes. 4:11–14].

Please note: the writer does not say, "some pastors and some teachers," but rather, "some pastors and teachers." The teaching function, very grandly delineated, is put forward as an integral part of the work of the ordinary ministry of the Christian Church. Let us look at three ways in which this teaching function must be performed today.

(*i*) We all admit the fundamental importance of the Bible for preaching and teaching. We must recognize, however, that modern biblical criticism has set question-marks over many traditional interpretations of Scripture, and that recent discoveries of great significance have placed the New Testament in an altered perspective—even to the point of raising radical questions about the validity of the Christian estimate of Jesus Christ himself. Perhaps some pastors, overwhelmed by the incessant demands of their parishes, do not see how they can find the time to become experts on the "Dead Sea Scrolls." But when a writer like Hugh Garner pontificates on the subject in a popular magazine, our people find time to read his articles, and for want of a clear lead from their Christian teachers the foundations of their faith may be quietly worn away.

(*ii*) We are slowly but surely growing in our awareness of the need of "catholicity," in the sense of a wholeness of understanding that lifts us above local, confessional, or traditional limitations into the age-old, world-wide fellowship of the *Una Sancta*. But how is such a wholeness of understanding to be achieved, if not by an ever-deepening knowledge of the riches of Christian thought in every age? Again, the time for close study of these riches is hard to come by amid the constant pressures of parish life. Yet if the pastor does not make the best use he can of the various aids to study accessible to him, he must fail his flock as their appointed teacher and guide in the quest for Christian maturity in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God.

(*iii*) Great movements of Christian thought in our day have recalled us to the confession and the worship of the transcendent God, "the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist" (1 Cor. 8:6). But the Christian conviction of the supreme reality of God is assailed in our time, not simply by scientific criticism of this or that aspect of the biblical story, but by radical philosophical questioning of the validity of religious thinking itself. In an age already strongly inclined to secularism, how can the pastor

hope to preserve in himself or in his people the sense of the divine and sacred, unless he has at least faced the challenge of a criticism more subtly dangerous than blatant atheism or naive naturalism?

The *Canadian Journal of Theology* has addressed itself (and will continue to address itself) to such problems as these. We are bold enough to think that such an enterprise is not without significance for the "pastors and teachers" of the Christian community in Canada.

E. R. F.

The Theology of the Preaching Office*

JOSEPH C. McLELLAND

THE office of preaching has been captured in our day by "practical theology." As a result it is the problem of method or technique which dominates the homiletical landscape. This approach depends on a very significant assumption, namely that the nature and the purpose of preaching are so well understood that most of our time can be spent on the "practical" question of methodology. But what if one is mistaken about this nature and purpose? Then all methodology will be as highly impractical as the behaviour of the athlete who turned out for the tennis tournament dressed in rugby uniform.

To avoid any such confusion, we shall be well advised to explore the background of homiletics, the doctrine of the preaching office. First let us consider preaching as a form of the Word of God. Then let us examine the nature of communication. Finally, let us turn to some suggestions about the ministerial office.

I. Preaching as a Form of the Word of God

It was a dictum of the Reformers that "the preaching of the word of God *is* the word of God."[1] There is a sense in which every Christian, especially every Christian theologian, has to begin again and again with the doctrine of the Word of God. For Christianity is not a religion, something to be approached exclusively in terms of comparative religion or of the philosophy of religion; it is a Gospel, a revelation through the divine Word that became incarnate in Jesus Christ our Lord. This Word was handled by the Apostles. How can you handle a word? That is the stinging question with which the Gospel faces man.

It is Karl Barth who has given us the most searching analysis of the doctrine of the Word, which he treats as prolegomenon to Church Dogmatics. Barth begins with the fact that the Church exists in and through proclamation. "The language about God to be found in the Church is meant to be proclamation, so far as it is directed towards man in the form of preaching and sacrament, with the claim and in an atmosphere of expectation that in accordance with its commission it has to tell him the Word of God to be heard in faith."[2]

*Based on a paper read at a Conference of Professors of Homiletics, held at Toronto in May, 1960, and sponsored by the Lilley Endowment.

1. *Praedicatio verbi dei est verbum dei*, a dictum found in Luther and in Bullinger.
2. K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/1, Sect. 3.

Barth analyses the doctrine of the Word according to its three forms, as preached, as written, and as revealed. The first form includes both preaching and sacraments; they are first because this is the actual starting place for sinful man, when he hears the Word of God addressed to him in preaching and sacrament. From there he may be led to the second "form" of the Word, namely, the written Word of holy Scripture, and thence to the third. The last is primary in an ontological sense, the Word as revealed in past and future and therefore in the present too.

It is preaching that constitutes the growing edge of the Church; it is the form in which the Word presses in upon man, convicts him and blesses him, judges him and saves him. Therefore, when we speak about preaching we are speaking about a form of the Word of God, and by implication we are speaking dogmatically, about a datum that must be enlightened by theological reflection and understanding. That is why Barth completes the section heading referred to by adding: "So far as, in spite of this claim and this expectation, it is *man's* word, it becomes the material of dogmatics, *i.e.*, of the investigation into its responsibility, measured by the Word of God which it means to proclaim."

Now the eternal, original, and unique Word of God is the "second person" of the Trinity, whom we know as Jesus Christ. According to the classic Christology of the Church, he is both divine and human, very God and very man. The other forms of the Word must correspond proportionately to him if they are to be valid forms of the Word. Therefore they too will partake of this divine-human relatedness, and will be both truly divine, a Word of God, and truly human, a word of man. One must not transubstantiate preaching into a pure and simple divine Word; neither can one so emphasize the human element that oratorical splendour becomes the measure of the office. A Christological heresy lurks behind both errors; preaching must be understood in the light of Christology. Dogmaticians on several fronts have been reminding us of this truth that God and man are together in Christ as a matter of fact, and that we must consider proclamation under the twin rubric, "The Word of God and the Word of Man in Christian Preaching." As it happens, this formula is the title of another of Barth's subsections, but lest we imagine that it denotes a peculiarly modern approach, let us turn back to Luther.[3]

Luther was nobody's fool. When he said that the preaching of the Word of God *is* the Word of God, he was quite well aware that many sermons are not worthy of such a description. This is why he stressed preaching of the *Word of God*. Let us listen to Luther's typically bold words:

> A preacher must not say the Lord's Prayer, nor ask forgiveness of sins, when he has preached (if he is a true preacher), but must confess and exult with Jeremiah: Lord, thou knowest that what has gone forth from my mouth is right and pleasing to thee. He must boldly say with St. Paul and all the apostles and

3. For quotations from Luther, see *Luther's Works* (ed. J. J. Pelikan), vol. 22 (St. Louis, 1957), pp. 370ff.; 482ff. Cf. K. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, I/1 (Edinburgh, 1949), pp. 101ff.; I/2 (Edinburgh, 1956), p. 746f.

prophets: *Haec dixit dominus*, Thus saith God himself; or again: In this sermon, I am a confessed apostle and prophet of Jesus Christ. It is neither necessary nor good to ask here for forgiveness of sins, as though the teaching were false. For it is not my word but God's, which he neither will nor can forgive me, and for which he must always praise and reward me, saying: You have taught rightly for I have spoken through you and the Word is mine. Whoever cannot boast thus of his preaching repudiates preaching; for he expressly denies and slanders God.

Luther's doctrine of preaching is this: "These two facts are entirely logical: that those who preach the Word of God must necessarily be sent by God; and, conversely, that those who are sent by God cannot proclaim anything but the Word of God." Therefore he can stress the unity of the divine-human event of preaching:

'Tis a right excellent thing, that every honest pastor's and preacher's mouth is Christ's mouth, and his word and forgiveness is Christ's word and forgiveness. . . . Therefore, we do well to call the pastor's and preacher's word which he preacheth, God's Word. For the office is not the pastor's or preacher's, but God's . . . . On the last day God will say to me, Hast thou also preached that? I shall say, Yea, exactly. Then God will say to thee, Hast thou also heard that? And thou shalt answer, Yea. And he saith further, Wherefore hast thou then not believed? And then thou sayest, Oh, I held it for a word of man, since a poor chaplain or village parson uttered it. So shall the same word which sticketh in thine heart accuse thee and be thine accuser and judge at the last day. For it is God's Word, 'tis God himself thou hast heard . . . . See to it, how thou standest.

Luther is an excellent guide in any talk of preaching. Preaching is a form of God's own Word, not men's word *about* God's Word, but the unique kind of human word that is at once human *and divine*. A doctrinal problem emerges, of course, parallel to that found in the great eucharistic debates between Lutheran and Reformed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is largely our failure to push back this debate to the more basic problem of the office of preaching considered in relation to Christology that has caused us to continue fruitless discussion about problematic issues. Is not Christ himself present "in, with and under" the preacher's words? This is Luther's question. Are not these words to be judged in terms of their faithfulness to the textual exposition? This is the Reformed concern.

II. The Problem and the Mystery of Communication

Gabriel Marcel has forcefully expressed the important distinction between problem and mystery.[4] The one may be rationally solved, but the other demands personal decision and commitment, for genuine mysteries "remain mysterious even when understood, because, though understood, they exceed our comprehension." The communication of truth between persons is perhaps mystery as well as problem, as Augustine maintained in his dialogue *De Magistro*, which served as textbook for medieval pedagogy. Certainly for Christian truth "mystery" is the proper category; it forms the "proper

4. Cf. M. B. Foster, *Mystery and Philosophy* (London, 1957), pp. 18, 20.

domain" of theology.[5] Linguistic philosophers today tend to miss the distinction; but at least they serve to force theology back upon prior questions of the validity and appropriateness of language about God.

Communication is a problem because it involves a discipline of submission or conformity to the truth one seeks to learn. The mind must be accomodated to the nature of its "object." Christian truth, however, is not simply personal but a person, this person who is also Lord. He has chosen to be identical with his message, he comes to us as "Christ clothed with his Gospel" (as our fathers used to put it). That is to say, Christ gives himself through his word of address, he communicates himself. This is why one cannot really "communicate" this truth as if it were truth "about" Christ, as if a man "knew" this truth apart from his conversion. Beyond the problem of understanding lies the mystery of the Saviour's redeeming encounter with man.

How different must *preaching* be from *oratory*, then! Indeed, oratory may be a major stumbling-block to "good" preaching, a confusion of vocations. It was Kierkegaard who stressed this fact of the personal being of Christian truth. He also stressed its historical factuality; you do not learn this as you do the timeless truths of mathematics. For this Christian truth is nailed to the scheme of history, to Jews, to Church Fathers and Doctors, to teachers in time and space. It addresses us in history, through historical means. This is why some people hear it very badly put to them, and many do not hear it at all. Every church school pupil recognizes this problem, while mature theologians must still argue the point.

This historicity is not a defect of Christianity; on the contrary, it is one of those peculiar problems that are signs of its mysterious character. When the Word became incarnate, he submitted himself to all that history means: limitation, dependence on historical communication, the contingency of space and time. God has entered time, has become human, has exchanged heaven for earth—or rather for hell. This unsettling fact means that our preaching ought to proclaim:

> God's in his *hell*,
> All's right with the world!

Such a reversal of rôles is the heart of the Gospel. It prevents Christianity from becoming a religion of a heavenly deity known by spiritual attainments. If God is to be known in his humanity, then the decisive thing is the Word in its forms, the proclamation of Christian preaching and sacraments. And this involves the other aspect of the scandalous Gospel, namely, that God acts like this because he is reconciling the world unto himself, so that man cannot "know" this truth without being caught in its reconciling power. This communication "solves" the problem of knowing by the mystery of being.

The unity of knowing and being is seen in the strange and wonderful Hebrew usage according to which the same verb is used for God's knowl-

5. Cf. M. J. Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity* (St. Louis, 1946), p. 18.

edge of his people and for the sexual union of a married couple. It is seen also in the fact that church proclamation demands both preaching and sacrament. The liturgical revival has helped us here. In Britain, for instance, it used to be said that in Scotland one always knew what the preacher would say in his sermon but never in his prayer, while in England a clergyman's prayers could be fully anticipated, but certainly not his sermon. Today the two emphases are held together in creative tension, so that although the balance of the two is no easy problem, yet there is a growing recognition that the sermon belongs in a proper liturgical setting, while the liturgy involves the preaching office. (Incidentally, it needs to be stressed that there is no such thing as "non-liturgical" worship. *Leitourgia* means "service," and any order of worship is liturgical. It may be bad liturgy but it cannot be non-liturgical.)

In reality, therefore, preaching has not only an outward sacramental relationship, but an inner sacramental structure. Ronald Ward's book, *Royal Sacrament*, describes preaching as "the sacramental offering of a Person. . . . The ultimate aim of preaching is to give Christ. He is offered in words; He may be received in Person. Thus preaching is a sacrament."[6] We may say then that there is memory, anamnesis, and re-presentation, not only in the Eucharist, but in preaching as well. In its turn, eucharistic prayer includes the tremendous proclamation of the kerygma. This sacramental prayer is a kind of preaching, just as preaching is a kind of sacrament.

If oratory may obscure the preaching office, so may the misuse of odds and ends of liturgical cosmetics, so to speak, which hide and distort the true face of divine worship. The old term "diet of worship" signified something deeper—the balanced meal of orderly progression both in the liturgical year and in expository preaching from week to week.

What we are recovering today is the dimension of dramatic encounter in both preaching and sacrament. In these two forms of proclamation, Christ himself confronts man. Just because he was and is the Word incarnate, he confronts man in the flesh, with words that seek to be deeds. That is why we may use the term *drama* with some degree of correctness and fruitfulness. Drama, after all, began in religious liturgy. Two and a half millennia ago, in the cultic worship of Dionysos, the classic form of the dramatic art, Greek tragedy, was born.

This was a mystery religion; its theme was death and resurrection; its liturgy involved ritual singing and dancing, entrance and exit, light and darkness, pantomime and commentary. And one day—so legend has it—a chorister named Thespis turned from his part in the liturgy to address the worshippers in the name of the god. Even the developed art did not lose this elemental conviction that drama is a liturgical act in which the power of the god himself is present. The drama is a peculiar sort of dialogue in which players and spectators, through pathetic and empathetic encounter, re-

6. R. A. Ward, *Royal Sacrament* (London, 1958), pp. 14, 22.

present the basic facts of life. Together they enter the dimension of suffering and fate, in order to win through to hope and immortality. The drama is a meeting of lives in a ritual of contest and struggle, in the crucible of death.

How much of all this can we or should we apply to preaching? Is there a parallel to Greek experience in the wholeness of worship restored in preaching and sacraments, in word and deed, in things said (*kerygma*) and things acted (*drama*)? Are we perhaps dealing with a pagan grasp of that parabolic "sign" which is so central to the biblical understanding of communication? The *mysterion* of the Kingdom of God is mirrored in the mystery of parable and miracle by which Christ brought it in. These were "signs" of the divine-human sign himself.[7] Communication involves a unique kind of human language and human work, so that the office of preaching involves a unique kind of function.

III. Ministerial Midwifery and Motherhood

The old method of catechetical instruction by question and answer has recently been investigated by T. F. Torrance, who defends it on the ground that theology is bound to be *dialogical*: "It is concerned throughout with the address of the Word of God and the obedient response of faith."[8] Preaching is part of the dialogue between God and man; but this dialogue has already received a definite completion in Jesus Christ, the one true God who loves man and calls him in grace, and the one true Man who loves God and follows him in faith.

The preacher witnesses to this event named Jesus Christ, but he is also part of the event. This involvement is inherent in the mystery of communication, but it reaches a peculiar intensity in Christian communication. An excellent analogy to assist us here is that of the virgin birth of our Lord—or of Mary's office of handmaiden, if we wish to by-pass the problem of the place of the Birth in the Gospel records. I am convinced that the Protestant failure to appreciate the significance of mystical theology for its doctrine of faith (despite the clear emphasis of Luther and Calvin, for example) is reflected in its suspicion of the person of Mary. (This suspicion, of course, is not quieted by the expansion of Mariological errors in Romanism.)

Mary is a picture of humanity dedicated to the doing of the Spirit of power, whose visitation engendered the Word like seed within her. He comes and he goes, this Spirit; such is his freedom. But his coming and going are according to the Word, for he is the Spirit of Jesus Christ. The office of preaching cannot be spoken of fruitfully or realistically except in

7. It is a pity that Paul Tillich has redefined "sign" and "symbol" to the confusion of the biblical concept of *semeion*. Cf. *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II (Chicago, 1957), p. 9. For Tillich, sign is "only a sign," whereas symbol "participates in the reality which is symbolized." Although this has some weight in view of the traditional understanding of theological symbolics, nevertheless the classic scholastic and renaissance discussions of *signum* and *res* presupposed the participation of the "sign" in the "reality" signified; this was decisive in the eucharistic controversies, at least. Cf. T. F. Torrance, "A Study in New Testament Communication" (*Scottish Journal of Theology*, September, 1950), for the concepts of *lalia* and *logos* in Christ's parabolic teaching.

8. T. F. Torrance, *The School of Faith* (London, 1959), p. xliii.

terms of the office of the Holy Spirit. There is much talk these days about our neglect of the doctrine of the Spirit. It is true that the Church has never articulated a consistent doctrine of the third person of the Trinity as it has of the first and second—but does not one reason for this omission lie in the very nature of the Spirit? He is not "objective" in the same sense as Father and Son (I speak improperly); no one witnesses to him for his own sake. His work consists in witnessing to our Lord, in bringing him to birth in men, and in bringing men to birth in him. This is why the doctrine of the Spirit is a kind of postscript to the doctrine of Christ, rendering it vital and relevant. Pneumatology is applied Christology.

In such a context, the ministerial office is seen as a kind of midwifery. It was Socrates who described himself as a species of midwife, a maieutic philosopher assisting at the birth of ideas. Just a century ago, Kierkegaard compared the Socratic method with theology. Because of human sinfulness there are not "true ideas" within, already conceived. We can act as midwives only to the point at which our dialogue is no longer effective, when we must become direct witnesses to the truth that is outside man, in Jesus Christ. By this means Kierkegaard advanced one step beyond Socrates.

Let us advance one step beyond Kierkegaard. We should take with the utmost seriousness Paul's words to the Galatians, "My little children, with whom I am again in travail until Christ be formed in you," and to the Corinthians, "I became your father in Christ Jesus through the Gospel."[9] And we must also consider how Paul says, time and again, that by faith a man is "in Christ," and Christ is "in us."

This is nothing less than a definition of faith as *union with Christ*. I submit that this is the classic and normative definition, enunciated by our Lord himself, by St. Paul, by the Fathers, by mystical theologians, and by the Reformers. Without this definition, faith becomes a human work, a subjective distortion matched by a false kind of preaching.

In Christ man becomes a new creation. But the other side of this miracle and mystery of the new birth—Christ's side as it were—is the fact that our Lord himself still condescends to us in the humility of his revelation, still comes into a man's life in the form of an infant, is "born again" whenever the event of faith occurs. What the Holy Spirit conceives and the Church mothers is a new man in Christ and Christ in that man. It is at this birth that we are called to assist in our maieutic office of communicating the Word through preaching. Here too is the *risk* of our ministry. The complex nature of the union of faith, especially the mystery of its motherhood, means that our midwifery passes over into parenthood, that our ministry is convulsed with the travail of birth itself. To deliver—yea, to be parent to —babes in Christ; to share Christ's own ministry as he communicates himself to men through his ordained ministry of word and sacrament; this labour involves great hazard. For what if, by false teaching, or by true teaching at wrong times, we deliver an abortion, or stifle an infant heartbeat?

9. Gal. 4:19; 1 Cor. 4:15.

That wise teacher of the early Church, Origen, expressed the risk when he said:

I often think of the maxim, "It is dangerous to talk about God, even if what you say about him is true". The man who wrote that must, I am sure, have been a shrewd and dependable character. There is danger, you see, not only in saying what is untrue about God but even in telling the truth about him if you do it at the wrong time.[10]

According to this view, preaching requires both identification and non-identification with those to whom we preach. In writing of "the gift of ministry," Daniel Jenkins has described the true preacher:

All the doubts and difficulties and terrors which confront mortal men as they face the temptations and hazards and ambiguities of existence should be his familiar ground. Life at its grimmest and harshest should have an almost morbid fascination for him. Wherever there is trouble he should be found. He is the one man among all men who cannot be permitted the luxury of a sheltered life. . . . Of all men, he has to be the freest thinker, allowing the most dangerous of facts to lead him wherever they will, without regard to personal safety or comfort or professional prestige, offering himself on the altar of God's truth, that God's glory might be made manifest in his weakness.

Such identification is the secret of genuine dialogue, in which the preacher does not confront his fellowmen as a religious man addressing sinners, but simply as *man to man*. Both stand in the common humanity that Christ seeks and saves. At the same time, the preacher must recognize that his message is not identifiable with the standards and the assumptions of his hearers. Surely it is a prime responsibility of homiletics teachers today to stress this non-identity, this radical break, this disturbing two-edged sword of preaching. There is too much conformity today; there are too many domesticated parsons, too many preachers who have made themselves "homiletical eunuchs" for the sake of a heavenly kingdom. This will not do; only real manhood will do in the pulpit. Otherwise we fail to let the genuine *scandalon* of the Gospel confront our hearers. Bultmann is trying to make this clear, when he insists that "Christ meets us in the preaching as one crucified and risen. He meets us in the word of preaching and nowhere else. The faith of Easter is just this—faith in the word of preaching."[11] And Paul Tillich also speaks of overcoming the wrong stumbling blocks ("our inability to communicate") in order "to bring people face to face with the right stumbling block and enable them to make a genuine decision."[12]

Once again the problem and the mystery of communication emerge to challenge us. The problem is complex: to revive biblical preaching as something more than mere "concordance preaching" which strings together thematic texts and thinks this is exposition; to find ways of using the Christian year and the lectionary as practical guides for a diet of preaching; to define

10. Quoted by J. Daniélou, *Origen* (London, 1955), p. 25.
11. R. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in H. W. Bartsch (ed.), *Kerygma and Myth* (London, 1953), p. 41.
12. P. Tillich, *Theology of Culture* (New York, 1959), p. 213.

methods of evangelism and teaching within the preaching office; to venture into new forms of dialogue and conversation, lest we define preaching too narrowly in terms of a pulpit message once a week, thus missing that "holy worldliness" to which Christ is calling us outside.

But too much concentration on the problems creates pessimists, experts of despair, ecclesiastical beatniks. We must cultivate humour. The maieutic task of Socrates involved the concept of irony; ours involves theological humour, the effect of justifying grace. When Abraham and Sarah received the promise of a son they laughed quite rudely, for they knew the facts of life, and so realized that this promise was humanly impossible. Then a son was born. Once again Sarah laughed; indeed she named her son "Laughter," Isaac. Surely it is in the Church alone that we can find such hearty humour at the good news of what God has done and continues to do in his overruling kindness. This is the secret of faith, and pre-eminently of the preachers caught up in the dynamics of its actuality. Bonhoeffer, a few days before his execution by the Gestapo, put it like this:

> This is the decisive difference between Christianity and all religions. Man's religiosity makes him look in his distress for the *power* of God in the world; he uses God as a *Deus ex machina.* The Bible, however, directs him to the powerlessness and suffering of God; only a suffering God can help.

Artistic Expression and Christian Life

GEDDES MACGREGOR

All modern discussion of Christianity and art might begin with a reminder about the Great Mistake. The Great Mistake, of course, is the idea that there is a choice between having art and not having it, or a decision to be made concerning the extent to which art is to be allowed or encouraged in Christian life and worship. There is no such choice, no such decision. We have art whether we like it or not. The question is whether it is to be good or bad. You can no more be confronted with a decision whether to have a lot of art or a little in the Church than you can be confronted with a decision whether to have a lot of expression on your face or a little. If you have a little rather than a lot of facial expression, it will be proper to describe your face as "dead-pan"; if you have, by dint of a Herculean effort, extremely little expression on your face, your appearance will be suitably described as very "dead-pan." If you take care to have as little personality as you can contrive, you will be designated a person with a colourless personality, even a person with a remarkably colourless personality. Perhaps you may account this an achievement; but not all achievements are commendable.

So it is with the face of the Church. If you work hard enough at the task of barring art from the Church you will have a "dead-pan" Church—at any rate as long as the Holy Spirit permits it. When worship consists, in its external expression, of a series of rows of people squatting on pew cushions with their ears cocked at a black-robed figure on an elevation opposite them, who reads at them, punctuating his reading by calling upon them for the singing of a hymn, so that the liturgical architecture is like a string of sausages culminating in a larger and fatter sausage tipped with an apostolic blessing, then the Church is as "dead-pan" as sinful human nature has so far contrived to make her.

It is not, however, to be supposed that this is the only way to damage the face of the Church. It is, indeed, a way that has for some time been going out of fashion. The modern tendency is rather to paint a smirk on the face of the Church. So much noise has been made about the advantages of "aids to devotion" and the like, and so much have the learned talked of symbolism, that there is no lack of inclination to decorate churches and church services with various bits and pieces from the past and a whole panoply of artistry that is thought in some way or other to be very up to date —in many cases because there has never before been such an opportunity for displaying bad taste. There is no need to make an inventory of the

Sacristy of Horrors. An elementary example will do for a start: the septuple amen. It does not need much general education to enable one to see that while it may be good liturgical artistry to pour forth alleluias in glorious profusion, it is less than this to utter repetitious amens, and much less still to sing them chorally or make a whole anthem or fugue out of one of them. The alleluia is a shout of praise to God. It is the expression, in a convenient and much-hallowed form, of the heart's unbridled joy in acknowledging the glory of its Creator and Saviour. There is no more reason to limit its utterance than there is for a lover to limit the number of times he will declare his love to the beloved whom he woos. A very different rôle must be assigned to the amen in our Christian liturgy. It signifies assent: "so be it." Indeed, in the liturgies of the French Reformed Church it is actually rendered: "ainsi soit-il." If you have any doubt of the absurdity of three-fold or seven-fold amens, try a French one. The amen punctuates a prayer. It is the people's assent to what the minister says to God on their behalf or in their name. It marks the people's wakefulness. In a secular situation the audience might express themselves by applause; but in prayer there is nobody to applaud but God, who certainly does not need it. There is of course no exact counterpart, outside worship, of the function of the amen, for worship itself is, as an activity, *sui generis*. The nearest approach to it, however, is perhaps when we shout "Right" or "Okay" as a work is proceeding. This is something we say in a business-like way; only a person in need of psychiatric care would attempt to make a grand opera out of it. Of course the cult of the septuple amen does not arise from psychiatric disturbance; it springs, rather, from ignorance of the riches and complexity and splendour of Christian worship, which is no more to be improved upon by whimsical fancies than is the Mona Lisa to be enhanced by a caste-mark on her forehead.

It is true that liturgy is a living activity, the expression of the Church's supreme action. So it is not changeless, but rather, like the Church herself, ever new yet ever the same. It changes; it develops; it unfolds, as does, in its own way, a symphony. This is not to say, however, that in order to improve a symphony you have only to think of something you have never thought of before and add it as pepper to canned soup. When a church building, planned or engineered to be different from any ever designed before, turns out to look a little like a fish (albeit a fish unknown to ichthyologists), it is too much to hope that by recalling the *ichthus* symbol one will somehow squeeze meaning into chaos or invest our Christian heritage with an adornment. It may seem a welcome novelty in church design to have, in a building furnished for the Reformed Church tradition, a pulpit shaped like a "v" to represent the Open Book and to put by the side of it an empty chalice set upon the holy table. The fact remains, however, that what is actually communicated by the expression is rather the notion of a hollow voice in an empty cup, and not all the stained glass of Chartres or all the mosaics of Ravenna would do more than accentuate the aching sadness of the void. The idea seems good; the idea sounds good; the idea might *be* good, were it

being applied in a lesser context than that of our infinitely rich Christian faith and infinitely holy Christian heritage.

The Christian artist, like all artists, paints what he sees reflected in the stream of life. It is a truism that no artist should be didactic, for the artist's *métier* is expression, not pedagogy. Nevertheless, since teaching is of the essence of the Church's life, it is impossible that any genuinely artistic expression of the Church's life should fail to be capable of teaching. Indeed, art has always been the principal medium of the life of the Church as *ecclesia docens*. Disparagement of the visual arts in the Church is not only unrealistic; it is also the outcome of ignorance and arrogance—of ignorance because it ignores the truth that the Church's riches are so great that all media must be enlisted in service of the hope of expressing them, and of arrogance because it ineffectively conceals adherence to the peculiarly anthropocentric view that knowledge of an alphabet brings a man nearer the Kingdom of Heaven. It is notorious that biblical literalists (than whom there are no more fundamentally irreligious people) are largely drawn from those who, being able to read a little, are fascinated by the fact that they can read at all. A more generous frame of mind and heart is needed in him who would keep company with God. Above all, this hope demands great humility; it is said that the heavenly gates are built low, because those who enter them are used to stooping. No truly humble man has ever denigrated art that has humbled itself in the service of God.

The relation of art to Christianity is both unremarkable and peculiar. For art, as expression, can be the vehicle either of man's most arrogantly self-centred pride or of his most profoundly Christian humility. The artist, as such, rightly glories in his autonomy; but in fact his independence, real though it be, is the independence of a child. Unwittingly, the artist—at any rate in his working hours—is serving self or God. He is either narcissistically nourishing the most self-destructive forces of egoism in his own soul on pretext of catharsis, or else he is humbly feeding upon the green pastures of Christ's flock, that are watered by the stream of eternal life. Good art leads to heaven or to hell, for it is always in fact enlisted in the service of one master or another. Bad art leads nowhere except in the sense that it leaves a man helplessly shut out from God in a wilderness of his own making. If he makes the wilderness in the very garden of the Church itself his case can hardly be accounted hopeful.

Art, being expression, is always one; yet for this very reason it must be said that Christian art is different from all other art, since Christianity is unique. The artist, as such, whether he is expressing his own sultry and egoistical passions or the glory of the infinitely generous love of God, is expressing what, for good or ill, he has found. Nevertheless, whenever an artist succeeds in expressing, in even the most seemingly trivial way, so much as a single aspect of the Christian faith and life, his work glistens with the whole shimmering splendour of the Church, thereby delighting some and blinding many. Art is a handmaiden so lowly yet so intimately close to the heavenly throne that they who seek to please him who sits upon it will not

despise the instrument he so favours and exalts. In the Middle Ages Mary became the personification of this mystery at the heart of the Church's life. Only by the triumph of a crude literalism was the Marian function so extended that men lost sight of the delicate interior meaning of the personification. If "gray with dust is Dante's crest", it is because of the gross denigration of art as the instrument of God. By the denigration of art there are lost all too easily both the delicate subtlety and the earthy robustness of the sound of God in the interior castle of man's soul.

True, there is an ever-present danger in art. It is the danger that lies in language itself, which is of course, from at least one point of view, a form of art. Art, like history, is concerned with the individual. In itself it is finite and fragmentary. When, in Satanic rebellion, it puffs up its own pretensions, it succeeds only in making its fragmentariness and finitude more ostentatiously brash. It is precisely because through Christ is redeemed not only man but man's culture and man's art that the latter is capable of a transformation that is the very mirror of the redemptive process itself. Art, yoked to Christ, expresses more than the individual artist can know. It becomes sacramental in character, and the artist, like the medieval cathedral builders who are said to have built better than they knew, expresses more than there is in any human artist to express.

Nor should it shock those jealous for the autonomy of art to be told that Christ's yoke enhances it. Every artist knows that no art is genuine that has not submitted itself to one burden or another. The imaginative genius of the artist is not undisciplined fancy; it is indeed the very avoidance of this that is the life of art. The sculptor must wrestle with an intractable medium; the poet, whatever literary licence he may claim, must submit himself to the discipline of language. If, in Joycian fashion, he invents neologisms and portmanteau words, triple-punning in Telugu, Finnish, and French, it is certainly not through indiscipline that he succeeds. It is not insignificant that the Sistine Chapel ceiling was painted by an artist handicapped by a very uncomfortable position and that translators constrained by rather arbitrary rules not of their own making produced, in the King James Version, the greatest masterpiece in English prose. The principle is most striking when the artist is able to submit himself to the easy yoke and the light burden that are Christ's. As conscience is the fruit of a disciplined life, so taste is the offspring of disciplined expression. Freedom of fancy is the way to tasteless eclecticism—that kind of eclecticism that springs from lack of commitment as much as from lack of historical perspective.

Much was written, for much needed to be written, in the earlier decades of the present century, on artistic freedom and the peculiarity of the artist's calling. Puzzles, however, remained for the aesthetician—puzzles that raise problems which I do not believe it is possible to solve in any satisfactory theory of art, because I do not believe that any satisfactory theory of art can say what it must say about aesthetic experience without leaving a mystery that the aesthetician as such must acknowledge to be beyond his province. One important aspect of this mystery emerges in the problem of

artistic novelty and creation. To this problem, as well as to the problem of particularity in art, aestheticians have increasingly addressed themselves. That every man is in his way an artist, as Croce contended, is really a truism in aesthetics. Yet it is extremely obvious to me as well as to others that I am no Michelangelo. There are no doubt Dickensians who appreciate aspects of Dickens that Dickens himself did not recognize; but not one of them is a Dickens. Whence comes the creative spark, the artistic genius, that makes the artist, as creator, a great man? Reputation and fame have nothing to do with it, of course; there are many besides Kierkegaard whose genius has gone for long unnoticed or ignored, and perhaps in some cases works of genius lie for ever buried, unacknowledged and unappreciated. It is not *only* that the artistic genius has expressed himself more successfully than do most of us. Many people express themselves perfectly yet in the very perfection of their artistic expression they but draw attention to the humiliating fact that they really have very little to express. It seems almost as though that is why they do it so well. A public speaker may be a brilliantly entertaining raconteur; but if he is nothing more than this we soon tire of him. We admire his gift, such as it is, and eventually we complain that he has nothing to say. We may for a whole hour watch a conjuror with more delight than we should ever feel in listening to a Kant; but if we understand Kant at all we shall listen to him much longer than we should ever conceivably be willing to watch a conjuror.

The fact is that art is fed from outside itself. As Croce put it in his own philosophical idiom, it is always the expression of an impression. But when we ask whence comes the impression, or why some impressions are so much richer than others, there is no conceivable answer that the aesthetician can legitimately give, for there is nothing in art that provides an answer. The impression lies beyond art; it lies elsewhere in human experience, being for instance nourished upon the rich pastures of our moral activity when it is not starved by the latter's barren desert. The isolated artistic activity is indeed amoral; but that of which it is the expression is the outcome of the morality and immorality that runs through the stream of the artist's life. It is in this sense, and this sense only, that art can be said to be not merely chaste or obscene but the instrument of God or Satan. Mauriac was right, therefore, in saying that society, in its attitude towards the artist, ought to begin by purifying the water so that they who drink of it shall not get sick. The artist *qua* artist is morally irresponsible; but the artist is much else besides. While it is true that *qua* artist he cannot help what the world does to the impressions he must express, it is no less true that as a man he may have weighty responsibilities. The Christian will also say, of course, that the fact that the artist's *métier* is expression does not prevent him, if he participates in the instrumentality of the Church, from engaging in an *expressio divinorum.*

Croce, in the epoch-making treatise, *Estetica*, published in 1901, really did for the philosophy of art what Wittgenstein and others did for the philosophy of thought. In estimating their services to philosophy we may set

aside the fact that he happens to be associated with an anti-metaphysical neo-idealism while the Vienna Circle are associated with an anti-metaphysical positivism. In both cases the service has been of the greatest importance, the dogmatic presuppositions of the respective parties notwithstanding. Nevertheless, there has already been abundant evidence of the need to recognize more fully that the isolation of elements is not the last word in the chemistry of the spirit. Far from dispelling mystery it really augments it.

Yet art, though it is not God's last word, is his peculiar tool. So far as the categories of human understanding go, we are justified in calling the Incarnation his artistic masterpiece in his dealings with us. We need not raise the finer points of Christology in order to say this, though the finer points of Christology may help us to appreciate its meaning. As members of the Church we are called upon above all to appreciate the splendour of this divine artistry and to give glory to God for it; yet as we are called upon to be participants in the life of the Church we are called upon to be artists in the expression of that life. It is true that we are expected to be artists of a special kind; nevertheless artists can never be so peculiar that they fail to *do* art. If we have caught even the faintest glimpse of the *visio Dei* that sustains the life of the pilgrim on his way to the heavenly Jerusalem, we must express it. That it is beyond the limits of human language to express is surely incontestable in all Christian experience. Then why should we limit our media? Does not such limitation ill conceal a pernicious neo-docetism that would destroy the life of the Church? Of course we may set ourselves, for one reason or another, certain disciplinary rules. We may ban, as in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, all three-dimensional art forms, and we may even spurn polyphonous music, as does the West in plainsong; but all this is not to repudiate or exclude from the Church, as did some of the English Puritans, whole realms of expression that acknowledgment of the mystery of the Incarnation really demands. It is, however, to remind us that Christian art is a difficult and most serious enterprise. *Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst*, is true only where art, being divorced from life, becomes mere play. Even then it means that, besides the good art that is mere play, there is perforce much bad art that is not play, yet that cannot help being bad because it is not allowed to be good.

Let us therefore not be surprised to find that the wickednesses that disfigure the Church (and which we think we can by mere discretion conceal from the vulgar gaze) are really being seen as clearly as if they were written in neon lighting across our spires. For our bad art tells the whole story all too well. We see this easily enough when we criticize a tradition other than our own—when we deplore, for instance, dime-in-the-slot electric votive candles that may black out without even the warning of a spurt or a flicker before your prayer is ended. Yet in its context this is hardly worse than "dial-a-prayer" (although admittedly to be able to dial to hear a prayer may be useful for those who cannot read, or whose sense of prayer has not yet developed beyond incantation). What would surely strike a Martian

theist (if there are any) most vividly in much contemporary Christian art is that it expresses the sin of our schism more than the Christian mysteries we acclaim. Too often our art fails because our life fails. Art cannot flow where life ebbs. We should listen more humbly to the voice of the simple souls who tell us how they react to the artistic expression of our life. A Hungarian refugee, taken for the first time in her twenty years of life to an American Protestant service, was asked how it struck her. Limited, no doubt, by the inadequacy of her English vocabulary, yet eloquent in her way, she replied: "Talk-talk-talk-talk, talk-talk-talk-talk". This is far from being a sufficient appreciation of the ministry of the Word, even at its worst; nevertheless, it draws attention to the poverty of our liturgical signs, symbols, and symbolification. The promise is that if Christ be lifted up he will draw all men unto him. There is no such assurance about the beholding of his rent garments.

The Christian artist must get behind the sinful fragmentation of the Church to the perfect integrity of the life that flows in it. The expression of this demands a maximum of artistic skill that will include, for example, among the basic techniques it presupposes, a profound understanding of history. Above all it demands a life of constant interior prayer, whose practitioners have always been humble enough to know that God uses not only the humblest of men as his instruments but also the humblest of means. Art, which Croce exalted in his philosophy by giving it the lowliest place in his quaternity of modes of human experience, is the means in which he delights. Words are for theologians, and even theologians would be unable to use them if the life of the Church were not expressed in art, for then they should have nothing to say. For the most telling language of God is the language of his love, and here, no less certainly than in human love, words are, though needful, inadequate: "The waters woo for me; the night replies". But if contemporary churchmen are to express, as we must, the mystery of God's love, we must not only learn to be more unfastidious about artistic media than many of us have been; we must learn that in Christian art there are subtleties not always so much as dreamt of in our impoverished philosophy.

Towards a Biblical Doctrine of Holy Communion*

STANLEY B. FROST

THE purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a number of modes of thought which are present in the Old Testament, and to argue that these thought-modes were also present in the minds of Jesus and his contemporaries, and that therefore any discussion of the significance of the Lord's Supper must take them seriously into account, especially when we further seek to expound the significance of that institution for the Christian Church in our time.

I

The most characteristic thought-mode of the Old Testament is surely that God is known by what he has done. Not the phenomenal world of nature but the temporal world of history is the supreme medium of revelation. This does not rule out a valid knowledge of God derived from his handiwork in creation, but it does indicate that such a knowledge is of secondary authority. God is primarily known in event. The prophet Micah cited the Exodus as the great example, and Psalm 78, while giving due prominence to that major event, presents us with a theological interpretation of all Israel's early history.[1]

Alongside this knowledge of God derived from history is the knowledge of God mediated by persons. It may be well to remember that the prophet does not here stand alone—the priest, the wise man, the king are other comparable instances—but the prophet is certainly the prime example. The Book of Deuteronomy expresses succinctly the Old Testament view of the prophet when it records God as saying to Moses: "I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their brethren; and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command him" (Deut. 18:18). Jeremiah similarly bears witness to the prophet's own sense of being charged with the divine self-revelation: "Then the LORD put forth his hand and touched my mouth; and the LORD said to me, Behold, I have put my words in your mouth" (Jer. 1:9).

A third characteristic thought-mode of the Old Testament is that God enters into a covenant-relationship with men. "I will be their God and they

*The Presidential Address to the Montreal Theological Society, October, 1960.

1. Cf. Micah 6:4f.; Ps. 135:5–14, and numerous other examples in the Psalter; Deut. 26:1–11.

shall be my people"[2] is the constant summary of this relationship, which obligates the people to their God and the God to his people—however much this latter thought is left inferred and not expressed.[3] This relationship of mutual election needs, however, to be initiated and renewed by some outward act or ritual; a particularly ancient example remains embedded in the Abraham story,[4] but the more usual ratification was a sacred meal.[5]

God is revealed in history and through personality and enters into a reciprocally obligating covenant-relationship with men. These are commonplaces of Old Testament studies, but they are not therefore to be dismissed lightly. They are commonplace because they are fundamental to Old Testament thinking as a whole. Nevertheless, having reminded ourselves of them, we can turn to other, possibly less often remembered aspects of Hebrew thought.

The men of the ancient world were clearly aware of the distinction between the material and the immaterial. Isaiah, for example, could say:

> The Egyptians are men and not gods,
> Their horses are flesh and not spirit.[6]

But for the Hebrews there was no violent dichotomy of the two. The material and immaterial aspects of experience did not have to be divorced from each other and kept in watertight compartments. Rather, the material could be, and in fact generally was, thought of as impregnated and charged with immaterial forces of great potency. The opposed categories (so basic to any understanding of the sacrificial system) of *ṭame'* (unclean) and *ṭahôr* (clean) and of *qadhôsh* (holy) and *ḥalîl* (common), presuppose that the material can be charged with immaterial qualities, and that these can indeed be transmitted from one material object to another. Haggai, for example, evokes a decision of priestly *torah*, whereby a man impregnated with uncleanness by touching a dead body and then coming into contact with food, is held to have transmitted that uncleanness to the food; similarly, the plans in the book of Ezekiel for the building of the Second Temple provide a vestry in which the priests are to unrobe "lest they communicate holiness to the people with their garments" (Ezek. 44:19). We may also recall the potency of Moses' rod,[7] and the disappointing lack of potency of Elisha's staff when it was laid on the dead son of the Shunamite woman (2 Kings 4:31).

In accordance with this same mode of thought we have the careful directions for obtaining and preserving the ashes of the red heifer for use in

2. Cf. Exod. 6:7; Levit. 26:12; Jer. 30:22, 31:33; Ezek. 11:20, 14:11, 36:28; Zech. 8:8, 13:9.

3. On covenants of sovereignty and of parity, cf. G. Mendenhall, in *Biblical Archeologist*, XVII (1954), p. 55. But note also Ps. 44:17, 26, where the clear implication is that Israel has kept *ḥesedh* (covenant loyalty), but Yahweh has not.

4. Gen. 15:9–11. Cf. Jer. 34:18. The ass was particularly the covenant-ratifying victim in Mesopotamia, and Hamor (ass) was the name of the Shechemite prince in Gen. 34; Shechem was the centre of a covenant-cult (Judges 9:4).

5. See further below.

6. Isa. 31:3. *'El* here is a generic term, parallel to *'adham*.

7. Cf. Exod. 4:17 and *passim*; Num. 20:7–9.

purificatory rituals (Num. 19:9). Moreover, the basic tenet of the Levitical system of sacrifices provides very clearly a parallel instance, in that blood of a sacrificial animal was used to effect the purification of the Temple furniture and of the great altar of burnt-offering, as prescribed in the ritual for the Day of Atonement. It is worthy of comment, however, that this blood was never used in physical application to purify men, though its application to persons is provided for in the ordination rites detailed for Aaron and his sons in the Book of Exodus:

> Then you shall take part of the blood that is on the altar, and of the anointing oil, and sprinkle it upon Aaron, and his garments, and upon his sons and his sons' garments with him: and he and his garments shall be holy, and his sons and his sons' garments with him.[8]

We may sum up our consideration of this mode of Old Testament thought by saying that the material aspect of man's experience can clearly be the medium for the transmission of those immaterial potencies of which he is aware in his day-to-day existence.

Another mode of Hebrew thought which is relevant to our subject is that of the so-called "acted oracle." When the prophet of Yahweh pronounced his divinely inspired message, he not merely announced but ensured that the thing prophesied would happen. The prophetic word was the divine word, and the utterance of it set in motion on the stage of human event the divine activity:

> For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven,
> and return not thither, but water the earth,
> making it bring forth and sprout,
> giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater,
> so shall my word be that goes forth from my mouth;
> it shall not return unto me empty,
> but it shall accomplish that which I purpose,
> and prosper in the thing for which I sent it.[9]

But sometimes the divine activity was not uttered in words alone, but was also set forth in inspired actions. So Ahijah the Shilonite tore his new cloak into twelve pieces, giving Jeroboam son of Nebat ten (1 Kings 11:29f.); Jeremiah smashed in pieces the earthenware flask in the sight of the elders of Jerusalem (Jer. 19:1f.); and Ezekiel acted out in desperate mime the implacable decision of Yahweh to destroy the guilty city:

> And you, O son of man, take a brick and lay it before you and portray upon it a city, even Jerusalem; and put siege works against it and cast up a mound against it; set camps also against it and plant battering rams against it round about. And take an iron plate and place it as an iron wall between you and the city; and set your face toward it, and let it be in a state of siege and press the siege against it. This is a sign for the house of Israel.[10]

In all such prophetic activity the intention was not merely to illustrate or to make more vivid the divine word, but in fact to set it in motion. Just as in a

8. Exod. 29:21.
9. Isa. 55:10f.
10. Ezek. 4:1–3.

missile, the reaction which occurs on a small scale in the detonator triggers off the explosion of the whole deadly machine, so what the prophet by divine command had done on the small scale would shortly take place on the vast.[11]

We may note in passing that this mode of thought and the one previously discussed came vividly together in the Elohist's account of the ratification of the Mosaic covenant.[12] After the terms of the covenant (*i.e.*, the Book of the Covenant, Ex. 20:22–23:33) had been read and agreed, Moses took half of the sacrificial blood and dashed it against the altar, and half he threw over the assembled people. The material, in this case sacrificial blood, is the medium of the immaterial covenantal bond, and the action of splashing it on altar and people alike is closely allied to an acted oracle, in that it effects the unity of God and people in one sacred covenantal society.

Another feature of Old Testament thought which we need to note is the assumption that to eat of the same sacrificed animal is to be bound in bonds of close relationship. We recall the poignant verse:

> Even my bosom friend in whom I trusted,
> Who ate of my bread, has lifted up his heel against me.[13]

Even a common meal draws men together; but a sacred meal binds man and man in solemn covenant, as when Jacob offered sacrifice and ate bread with Laban and his party to ratify the covenant which they entered into before Yahweh at Galeed (Gen. 31:51–53), or as Moses and Jethro and all the elders of Israel ate together "before God" in the desert (Ex. 18:12). The sacrificed animal was a life, a *nephesh hayyah*, an individual potency; being shared by two who consume it together, it becomes a powerful bond of unity between them. This is true not only of man and man, but also of man and God. The offered life in which mortal and deity have shared binds them in a covenantal unity. Thus, in the Yahwist's account, the covenant between Yahweh and Israel was sealed by seventy elders of Israel going up to Yahweh's dwelling to eat with him there:

> Then Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu and seventy of the elders of Israel went up; and they saw the God of Israel and there was under his feet as it were a pavement of sapphire stone, like the very heaven for clearness. And he did not lay his hand on the chief men of the children of Israel; they beheld God and ate and drank.[14]

It is this same mode of thought which provides the rationale for the *shelem* or communion-meal type of sacrifice. Part of the animal was, by being burned on the altar, given to God as his share of the victim; part was taken by the priest as his fee; and the rest was eaten at the shrine by the wor-

11. Cf. Elisha's injunction to Joash to help him shoot "Yahweh's arrow of victory" (2 Kings 13:14f.). Because the king struck the ground with the symbolic arrow three times only, the number of factual victories could also be only three.

12. For this analysis of Exod. 24:1–11, cf. A. H. McNeile, *Exodus*, 3rd edit. (Westminster Commentaries, 1931), *in loc.*

13. Ps. 41:9.

14. Exod. 24:9–11.

shippers and their friends (cf. 1 Sam. 2:12–17). The community of God and man was thus actualized, not merely symbolized.

Finally we must pay particular attention to that mode of thought to which the "myth and ritual" school have directed our attention. According to their reconstruction of the New Year Festival, when the myth of creation was recited and the ritual of the primeval battle of the Creator with the forces of Chaos was re-enacted, the victory of Yahweh was renewed and his divine sovereignty was made effective for another year. This ritual was not simply a remembrance of the creation of the world; it was the act of creation's renewal. The divine power which ensures law and order in the cosmos was reasserted and the original moment of creation was renewed, so that this present is identified with primeval time and Yahweh becomes King *now*. "The Lord reigneth" (the opening phrase of Psalms 97 and 99, for example) is not intended as a general statement of an abiding fact, but is rather a cultic cry of coronation whereby Yahweh's kingship is recognized and reconstituted for another year. It should be translated: "Yahweh has become King."[15] Psalm 93 is eloquent of the thought-mode which underlies the whole festival:

> Yahweh has become King; he is robed in majesty;
> Yahweh is robed, he is girded with strength.
> Yea, the world is established; it shall never be moved;
> thy throne is established from of old;
> thou art from everlasting.

The primeval act of lordship is now a contemporary truth. The rehearsal of the creative moment *b°re'shith* has made that moment a fact of present experience. The famous tag *Urzeit wird Endzeit* can be parallelled by another equally true: *Urzeit wird Nunzeit*, the beginning has become now.

II

I have taken my examples from the Old Testament with little regard for chronological periods, for (as Pedersen reminded us) the basic thought-modes of the Hebrews are remarkably uniform throughout the whole of the Biblical period. What I want now to emphasize is that there is, in this regard as in so many others, no violent break between Old Testament and New, and that these same mental attitudes persisted among the contemporaries of Jesus. They were therefore the natural ways of thinking of those who sat with him around the table of the Last Supper.

The biblical concept that revelation is primarily through significant events dominated Jewish thinking in the New Testament period as in the Old. Stephen's appeal to history at his trial (Acts 7), Paul's reliance upon history in his sermon in the synagogue at Pisidian Antioch (Acts 13:16f.) and, more significantly, his working around in his Athens speech to historical event after commencing with cosmological and moral considerations (Acts 17:22–31), all indicate the thoroughly Hebraic character of the apostle's

15. Cf. H. Gunkel, *Einleitung in die Psalmen* (Göttingen, 1933), p. 95.

thought. The very nature of the apostolic kerygma as isolated by Dodd emphasizes the point. To proclaim an event, the crucifixion of Jesus, as the evident setting forth of God's love and forgiveness for mankind (e.g., 1 Cor. 1:18–24) is clearly to reveal that the New Testament Christians were fundamentally Hebrew in their manner of thinking.

The thought that God is revealed in personality comes to its climax in the New Testament. Indeed, this mode of thinking is taken in the New Testament far beyond what any Old Testament instance can parallel. Whereas the Hebrew prophet claims to be significant because he is cognizant of the divine intention (Amos 3:7), or even because he is the chosen instrument of divine policy (Isa. 49:1–6), but thereafter submerges himself in Yahweh's message, Jesus in all four Gospels is constantly drawing men's attention to himself. He forces himself on their notice, insisting that they make a judgment upon him. "Who do you say that I am?" is the most characteristic of all the Synoptic sayings. John the Baptist wants to know whether Jesus is or is not the Christ, but is told he must decide for himself;[16] a Pharisee in the Temple seeking to know by what authority Jesus acted is similarly told to make his own assessment;[17] and at his trial Jesus would do nothing to help his judges arrive at their verdict—it must be their own judgment entirely.[18] Pilate or High Priest, judge or private individual, each one must make up his own mind and answer for himself. Who is he? This is the all-important question. The person or office of Jesus is in the later New Testament view of more significance than the actual content of his teaching, and we may note that the extrapolation of this mode of thought into the second Christian century results in the Apostles' Creed, which is concerned only with the person and role of Jesus and not at all with his ministry or teaching.

So much is widely and readily agreed. That the other thought-modes we examined are also New Testament ways of thinking is by no means so widely recognized. For the recognition that the material may be impregnated with, or act as a channel for, immaterial potencies, we may recall that Jesus

16. Cf. Matt. 11:2–6.

17. Cf. Matt. 21:23–27; 22:41–45.

18. The enigmatic *su eipas* in answer to the High Priest's question (Matt. 26:64) is interpreted by Mark as an affirmative, but not when the same reply is made to Pilate, for in both Matthew and Mark Pilate regards the reply as no answer, and wonders at the prisoner's legal "failure to plead." Luke follows Mark in assuming that "you say that I am" (Luke 22:70) is an affirmative reply to the High Priest, for he bases the charge of blasphemy on these words only—in Matthew the charge arises out of the reference to the Son of Man being seated at the right hand of God—and yet practically the same reply before Pilate (*su legeis*) is clearly taken as "failure to plead," for Pilate finds no fault in the accused. Had he been understood to answer affirmatively to Pilate's question, there would have been no question about his guilt. It would seem therefore that (a) Jesus used an enigmatic reply to the charges laid against him, neither affirming nor denying; (b) the charge of blasphemy arose out of a reference to the Son of Man; (c) the natural desire of the persecuted Church to record that Jesus made "a good confession" by giving a clear affirmative to the High Priest's question has tended to obscure the real meaning of his reply, which was to this effect: Now you have raised the important question. You said it, not I. And I am not going to answer it, because it is you who have to make the decision. Am I a deluded fool? a dangerous rogue? or someone other?

used his spittle to make clay in order to restore the sight of a man born blind (John 9), and that he and his disciples found no quarrel with the thinking of the woman who believed that to touch but the hem of Jesus' garment would bring her healing (Luke 8:43–44). On the contrary, he says "Your faith has made you well; go in peace." In Acts, we are told that handkerchiefs or aprons which had been in contact with Paul were "carried away from his body to the sick, and diseases left them and the evil spirits came out of them" (Acts 19:12). In the case of Peter, it was felt that even his shadow might be effective (Acts 5:15). The important thing of which we should take note is that neither the biblical characters nor the biblical writers scorn such ideas as superstitious or as unworthy of credence.

We noted a special instance of this mode of thought with regard to the blood of sacrificial victims as used in the Levitical cultus. We need here to recall that the sacrificial system was in full and undisturbed operation in Jesus' day and continued so for another forty years, which were the formative years of the Christian Church. So familiar were the contemporaries of Jesus and his immediate followers with this kind of thinking that it is a Christian and not a Jewish document which makes the general assertion: "Indeed, under the law almost everything is purified with blood" (Heb. 9:22). Certainly, these notions cannot be banished to the Old Testament as if they had no place in the New.

The concept of the "acted oracle" is represented notably in the New Testament by the much misunderstood incident of the barren fig-tree, in which the wrath of God falling upon an Israel barren of all righteousness is both foretold and ensured by the cursing of the fruitless tree and by its subsequent withering. The interpretation of the miracles of Jesus as "signs" by the Fourth Evangelist is clearly another indication of this same mode of thinking, but the simplest example is provided in the story in Acts, which tells how Agabus took Paul's girdle and bound his feet and hands and said, "Thus says the Holy Spirit, 'So shall the Jews of Jerusalem bind the man who owns this girdle and deliver him into the hands of the Gentiles' " (Acts 21:10–11).

The ideas associated with the communion meal persisted very strongly into New Testament times[19] as is illustrated particularly by the great stress laid on the communal meal among the Qumran covenanters.[20] The point needs no emphasizing, however, since the Passover meal itself was in Jesus' day, as before and since, the sufficient illustration.

19. The notion of *ḥaburoth* as religious societies somewhat akin to the Methodist societies in the eighteenth-century Church of England (cf. G. Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy* [Westminster, 1945], p. 50), having a weekly supper with its own particular rules and ritual, is strongly contested by J. Jeremias, *The Eucharistic Words of Jesus* (Oxford, 1955), p. 25, and can no longer be cited as evidence.

20. Postulants were not admitted to the communal meal until the completion of their second year in the community (*Manual of Discipline*, col. VI, lines 20–21). Cf. also Josephus on the Essenes (*Wars*, II, viii, 7). Concerning the initiate he says: "And before he is allowed to touch their communal food (*tēs koinēs trophēs*) he is obliged to take tremendous oaths." Earlier he remarks that the Essenes approach the refectory "as a sacred shrine," wearing special garments which they lay aside again when the communal meal is over "as holy vestments."

The Passover was, however, in Jesus' day more than simply a fellowship meal, for the Temple was still standing, and the passover lamb could still be offered and in fact constituted the main item for the meal. This lamb was of a sacrificial character, since it was killed in the Temple and its blood was poured out at the foot of the great altar. Thus the *shelem* character of the Passover was still preserved, in that in this meal God and man shared in the same offered life and were reunited in the covenantal bond. It was a fellowship meal not only of man with man but also of man with God.[21]

This aspect of Passover was further emphasized by the fact that then as now it was a "memorial" feast. It "remembered" the first Passover at the time of the Exodus, but in accordance with Hebrew modes of thought this was no mere act of nostalgic recollection, but was a recalling of that great act of deliverance out of the past into contemporary experience. The experience of redemption from Egypt was relived and the covenant with Israel was reinstituted. As the book of Deuteronomy emphasized in the seventh century B.C., the covenant first entered into in the thirteenth century is perennially contemporary: "Not with our fathers did Yahweh make this covenant, but with us, who are all of us here alive this day." The four-fold emphasis hammers for our attention: "us, here, alive, this day." This emphasis is still prominent in the Passover Haggadah today: "Every man in every generation is bound to look upon himself as if he personally had gone forth from Egypt. . . . It is not only our fathers that the Holy One redeemed but ourselves also did he redeem with them." The "memorial" act in the New Testament as in the Old is a recalling, a reliving of the original act: *Urzeit wird Nunzeit*, the first time becomes now.

III

It is now time to relate these ideas to the institution of the Christian Eucharist.

"Jesus took bread and when he had given thanks he broke it and said, This is my body which is for you. Do this in remembrance of me. In the same way also the cup, after supper, saying: This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." I have taken the Pauline version of the words of institution, as being probably the oldest. Against the background of our previous discussion, I wish to make these observations:

1. The bread, representing the body of Jesus, is solemnly broken. This is fully in accord with Biblical ideas of the acted oracle. As Ahijah's cloak represented Israel torn into twelve parts, so this bread broken represents the destruction of Jesus' body, *but does not merely represent*; it "announces oracularly," it ensures, it determines the future event, just as Jeremiah's breaking of the bottle made certain the approaching doom of Jerusalem.

21. Exod. 13:6 describes it as *Ḥag la'dhonai*. Deuteronomy tried to emphasize its sacral character by centralizing this celebration, along with all the other cultic acts (Deut. 16: 5f.), and we may think that the "plate for Elijah" in the modern celebration is a vestigial memory of the same thought.

The death of Jesus was "according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God" (Acts 2:23).

2. Bread is for eating. Matthew inserts the words "Take, eat" and is here clearly true to the intention of Jesus. At the time of Passover, the thought of eating is indissolubly connected with the thought of eating the Passover lamb —whether this meal was (as I think) the Passover meal or not.[22] Jesus is here putting himself in the place of the Passover lamb.

3. "Do this in remembrance of me." The purpose of the Passover meal was to enact a memorial in the Biblical sense—that is, to recall the original moment of deliverance and make it contemporary, and thus to renew the covenant for another year. By making himself the Passover symbol, Jesus is declaring the breaking of his body to be the new act of deliverance which the new Passover is to commemorate. The act of commemoration will recall that act of deliverance as always contemporaneous, and will institute perennially the new covenant of God and his people.

4. The death of Jesus thus supersedes the Exodus as the outstanding event in history whereby God is revealed to man. This can only be at all thinkable if we accept the New Testament evaluation of the person and rôle of Jesus. If Jesus is God uniquely revealed in personal terms, then his meaningful death may reveal God as could no other event. Only men who thought in Old Testament modes concerning personality and revelation, and transcended them, could accept that valuation of his death.[23]

5. The cup of wine in the acted oracle of this prophetic moment represents the blood of Jesus, which is now determined as that which will be shed on behalf of his followers. In the Passover context, blood is primarily that which constitutes the covenant, and is that which is the material means of immaterial realities. Paul, Mark, and Matthew, the only authorities which mention the cup, are all agreed that its association is with the idea of covenant.[24] The Christian Passover is primarily concerned to renew the covenant which is made possible by the death of Christ. The "memorial" of that death serves to renew the Covenant whenever it is celebrated.

We may conclude this section with a consideration of the Lucan and Johannine interpretations of the Eucharist. The Lucan account mentions only the bread. The reference to the earlier cup is clearly not to the eucharistic cup and the manuscripts which do introduce a second and eucharistic cup are in my opinion conflated with the Pauline account.[24a] For Luke (who probably was not so well versed in Old Testament thought as the authors of I Corinthians, Mark and Matthew, and to whom cultic associations therefore did not so readily occur) the only tradition is of the bread, and this he relates to the thought of the eschatological feast. His

22. Jeremias (*op. cit.*, pp. 14–57) strongly and cogently supports the identification. See also his bibliographical note (p. 177f.).

23. As Luther saw so clearly, the death of Christ must be viewed in the light of his person, and his person in the light of his death. Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh, 1913), p. 231f.

24. It will be noted that the associations of the term "blood" with the idea of cleansing are not in the forefront of the New Testament accounts of the Last Supper.

24*a*. Jeremias, *op cit.*, defends the longer text, but not I think convincingly.

characteristic name for the Eucharist is "the breaking of bread." These Lucan views might well represent a Syrian (largely Gentile) Christian attempt to interpret the institution in the light of their own background and interests. The Fourth Gospel, on the other hand, omits the whole account of the institution, but offers instead a midrash on the feeding of the five thousand, in which the manna of the wilderness wanderings following the Exodus is taken as a "type" of the eucharistic bread and the exposition which follows is in terms of hunger and nutrition, and the blood is briefly introduced as a source of renewal of vitality (John 6:53–56). Thus neither the Lucan nor the Johannine interpretations use the primary associations of the institution but take up a secondary range of ideas, to which the symbolism very naturally lends itself.

IV

The fact that Luke and John thus offer divergent expositions of the Lord's Supper from those of the earlier Pauline-Marcan accounts leads me to suggest that the very reason why Jesus gave us no book nor law, nor body of teaching, not even a constitution, but only a ritual, might well be because he wanted to leave his followers something which was capable of being viewed in many ways and with many emphases. If that is so, it is not merely true that there is in the Christian Church no agreed doctrine of Holy Communion, but it is also highly desirable that there never should be. Jesus said, "do this in remembrance of me", and we do it each with our variant understanding within the main lines laid down by the ritual and the words of institution. Acts and words guarantee sufficient unity, but the interpretations may legitimately vary widely. Thus we would do well, it seems to me, to remember that while the words "*merely* memorial" are not in the biblical vocabulary, any who approach the celebration of the Lord's Supper as pre-eminently a memorial are, if they understand the biblical sense of that term, very close to the original associations of the ritual. On the other hand, those who stress the eschatological reference of the Eucharist are in the Lucan tradition. Those again who emphasize the act of eating and drinking as a receiving of Christ into the heart are clearly in the Johannine tradition. Those who believe "the sacrifice of the mass" to be a memorial offering of Christ which repeats and is one with the original sacrifice, are remarkably biblical in their sense of the word "memorial," but are much less close to the original institution when they emphasize those expiatory associations of the term "blood" which are not to the fore in original Passover setting of the Lord's Supper. Such views lean on the markedly Hellenistic and quite un-Hebraic exposition of the significance of Christ's death by the writer to the Hebrews, rather than on any biblical account of the Lord's Supper; but at least they do not deviate from the original institution any more seriously than do Luke or John. There are again those who believe that the eucharistic bread and wine, having been consecrated to this high office, become charged with divine significance. Charles Wesley's great *epiklesis* comes to mind:

Come Holy Ghost our hearts inspire,
And realize the sign,
Thy life infuse into the bread,
Thy power into the wine.
Effectual let the tokens prove,
And made by heavenly art,
Fit channels to convey Thy love
To every faithful heart.

As we have seen the thought-form that the material may be the medium of the immaterial is to be found clearly present in both testaments, and the belief that the bread and wine may convey the presence of Christ to the faithful is undoubtedly a truly biblical idea.

The table of the Lord stands as always, where Jesus put it, at the centre of the Christian multitude. We look at it from differing points of view, and from very differing backgrounds. We all look through spectacles tinted by varying traditions and loyalties. If there is one place of all places where we should think and let think it is here. For any of us to claim that we, and we only, have the truth *here*, is inexcusable arrogance. When Luther and Zwingli parted company at Marburg in 1529, Christ was indeed crucified afresh, and while we are still divided at his table we deny him daily.

V

While the foregoing paper completes the task it set for itself, it leaves untouched a secondary question of such significance that it would be culpable to ignore it. How far are these biblical thought-modes an accurate account of metaphysical reality? To put it crudely, is it "true", for example, that bread and wine when consecrated can "convey" Christ?

There are on the contemporary theological scene two major divergent attempts to answer this question, and the former attempt has two notable expressions. The first expression is that of medieval theology and its continuing expression in the Thomism of the Roman Church. By means of Aristotelian categories the Thomistic theology attempts to build a bridge between the symbolism of the Eucharist and the ontological realities of man's experiential world, and it thus arrives at the doctrine of transubstantiation. This doctrine (like its Lutheran parallel of consubstantiation) appears to me to be as devoid of understanding the true nature of biblical thought-forms as would be the attempt to impose the categories of Linnaeus on the highly stylized floral motifs of a medieval tapestry. Just as "there is no way from 'ought' to 'is' which logic has not blocked," so too there is no way whereby the symbolisms of biblical thought can be logically metamorphosed into categories of ontological reality. The second expression of this same answer is that of Bultmann and of Tillich. Both recognize the symbolic character (better perhaps termed "mythic character") of biblical thought, and both attempt to relate it to ontological reality by translating it, feature by feature, into philosophical terms. Tillich discusses this in his little book *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, which is by way of

being an apologia for the grand attempt he is making in his *Systematic Theology* to translate the Christian myth into philosophically acceptable concepts. Bultmann, again, recognizes the mythic character of biblical thought and translates it (perhaps to nobody's satisfaction but his own) into the terms of existential philosophy.[25] In Tillich, the attempt results in an unsuccessful struggle by philosophical theology to accommodate elements foreign to its own enquiry but integral to the Christian myth (e.g., the "Fall"), and in Bultmann it results not so much in a "de-mythologizing" as in "re-mythologizing," so that we are as far from ontological reality as ever. All these attempts, Thomistic, Tillichian, and Bultmannian, are splendid failures, it seems to me, because they attempt what should not have been attempted—to make the image of the truths reflected in the mirror of myth step out of the frame into the cold light of ontological reality.

The other suggested way of solving the problem is to insist that the biblical myths are the only method of expressing truth which can boast the divine hallmark, and that our task is to live ourselves into "the strange new world of the Bible" and to stay there. This seems to be the summation of the Barthian refusal to countenance a philosophy of religion, and I do not see how Barth can be aggrieved if we group him in this respect with the Fundamentalists and charge him with intellectual obscurantism, and fail him because, in the classic examination-phrase, "he hasn't answered the question."[26]

My own view for what it is worth is that the study of biblical concepts shows that the Christian-biblical myth has to be taken as a whole and that it all adds up to an internally consistent interpretation of man and his place in the universe before God. But if we ask the philosopher (and even more the scientist) to start out from this biblical basis and relate the Christian *Weltanschauung* to his own, he has a right to reply as did the peasant, who was asked the way to Ballymena: "If I were going to Ballymena, I wouldn't start from here." But if the philosopher and the scientist are allowed to start from their own basis of thought they can (and often do) arrive at an account of man's existence which enforces the same moral imperatives and upholds the same sense of values as the Christian. The attempt to relate the human *goals* as envisaged by the philosopher on the one hand and the scientist on the other to the *goals* of Christian living is both legitimate and necessary. The attempt to relate the content of Christian myth to philosophical and scientific accounts of man's existence is on the contrary only to be achieved in terms of analogy and not of identity.

25. Cf. Ian Henderson's valuable monograph, *Myth in the New Testament* (London, 1952).

26. Cf. Brevard S. Childs, *Myth and Reality in the Old Testament* (Naperville, Ill., 1960), p. 101: "One can seriously question whether Barth has solved the problem of history or merely avoided it."

The Great Discovery

H. H. WALSH

BEFORE the prospect of interplanetary exploration loomed upon the horizon, writers on discovery were inclined to stress the singularity of Columbus' first voyage to America. Today we hesitate before saying that "nothing like it can ever be done again."[1] But even if the unprecedented character of this voyage into the outer space of the medieval world should be matched or overshadowed by a voyage into the outer space of the contemporary world, the dynamic effect of the great discovery of the fifteenth century will still remain written large on the pages of history, and historians will continue to trace its influence in all departments of life: in trade and commerce, in political and social development, and in church reform.

I

The connection between the discovery of America in the fifteenth century and the religious reformations of the sixteenth century may not at first sight appear obvious, and must to a large extent be argued from chronology; yet when it is recalled that it was only twenty-five years after Columbus' first voyage to the West Indies that Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the church door at Wittenberg, and only twenty-five years later that Paul III issued a bull which led to the assembling of the Council of Trent and thus set in motion a counter-reformation, it does seem highly probable that the former event had some bearing upon the two latter. It is true that there had been many attempts to reform the church before the discovery of America—John Wycliffe and John Huss had both anticipated Luther's defiance of the papacy; the great reforming councils of the fifteenth century were as keen as Trent to strengthen the church to meet the attacks of its critics and enemies—but these earlier reformers and councils failed in their objectives whereas the latter succeeded beyond all expectation. There would seem, therefore, to be some ground for arguing that the sixteenth-century achievement was due to the great stimulus administered to the human psyche by the amazing discovery of a new world.

1. Cf. John Fiske, *The Discovery of America* (Boston and New York, 1892), Vol. I, p. 446: "The first voyage of Columbus is thus a unique event in the history of mankind. Nothing like it was ever done before, and nothing like it can ever be done again." See also A. P. Newton, *The Great Age of Discovery* (London, 1932), p. 4f.; J. B. Brebner, *The Explorers of North America* (London, 1933), p. 3. Brebner does admit the possibility of Columbus' discovery being outranked: "Unless mankind is to embark some day on interplanetary exploration, there can never be a geographical adventure like the discovery and exploration of the Americas."

The stimulation was at first perceived in the form of a shock; and the church's primary reaction was, in conservative quarters at least, a warning against prying into the forbidden secrets of the universe. Explorers were bluntly told that there were better things to do than to waste one's time trying to grasp such complex knowledge as exploration demanded. Sebastian Brant, in his famous satire *Das Narrenschiff*, published two years after Columbus' initial voyage, pours scorn on "man's folly in trying to know so large a subject as the earth when he can hardly know himself." Sardonically he asks,

> Why should we humans seek to be
> More than we are in verity?

to which he adds,

> Some have explored a foreign land
> But not themselves can understand.[2]

This outburst was a reflection of the spirit that distinguished the medieval from the modern world; the former regarded the life of contemplation or monastic retreat as the ideal, whereas the latter has chosen the life of action directed to the world around it. The choice had already been made by the humanists, of whom Brant was one—though it would appear almost unwillingly, for he still had a nostalgia for the medieval world, even if his very vehemence in denouncing fools seeking a fool's paradise in an unknown world led him to rebuke many of the evils within the churches, since he felt that these had created the restless spirit which indulged in exploration. Because of its author's ambivalence, the *Narrenschiff*, which was supposed to be a defence of the good old days, has been described as "a most effective preparation for the Protestant Reformation."[3]

Brant had many sympathizers in his last-ditch stand against the new trend. More than a decade after his own lament, a chaplain of the College of Ottery St. Mary in Devonshire, Alexander Barclay, writes in his *Ship of Fools*, in words reminiscent of Brant:

> . . . And so this fole castyth
> his wyt so wyde
> To know eche londe vnder the
> fryament
> That thereabout in vyne his tyme
> is spent. . . .[4]

Even more shocking to conservative theologians than the appearance of the activist spirit was the information that these newly discovered lands were inhabited by weird savage folk, thus giving credence to medieval speculation about an antipodal world peopled by strange human beings who shaded off into "Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire".[5] St. Augustine in the fifth

2. Quoted by F. T. McCann, *English Discovery of America to 1585* (New York, 1952), pp. 73–74.
3. *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 14th ed., Vol. IV, p. 38.
4. Quoted by F. T. McCann, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
5. J. Fiske, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 311.

century had raised a question about the theological position of semi-human creatures, but decided its solution could wait until such creatures were discovered. The responsible church leaders of the middle ages went further than St. Augustine. They held that such speculation itself was wrong and refused to give any credence to the existence of beings, human or semi-human, beyond the reach of Christ's command to "make disciples of all nations".[6] When Portuguese sailors, returning from voyages down the coast of Africa, first announced the existence of a hitherto unknown race of men and women, many churchmen still disbelieved, but after the discovery of America this was no longer possible, and so the Church was compelled to reinterpret its theology in the light of this new knowledge.

Admission of the existence of an antipodal people was perhaps less of a shock to orthodox churchmen than the admission that the world is spherical in shape. According to medieval conceptions no such flood as that described in the seventh chapter of Genesis could possibly have occurred on a globular earth; in defence, therefore, of the truth of the Scriptures it was necessary to maintain the popular view that the earth was a rectangular plane. Although Ptolemy's spherical theory of the universe was well known among the learned, including many clergymen, yet it was not officially approved by the Church, which was inclined to side with Cosmas Indicopleustes, a monk of Alexandria and a self-proclaimed Christian geographer, who maintained in opposition to Ptolemy that the inhabited lands of the earth are in the centre of the floor of the universe, "surrounded on all sides by a great ocean." It was dangerous to sail for any distance into this limitless sea, even though Cosmas felt inclined to concede that in some far corner beyond the ocean "is the Paradise from which Adam and Eve were expelled".[7] This was a concession hardly likely to encourage exploration—not at least until it was possible to retain one's sense of direction in the vast ocean lying between Europe and Paradise. When at last by the invention of the compass the ocean became more navigable there was considerable hesitation on the part of mariners to use this new guide lest like Roger Bacon they be condemned as magicians.[8]

All these theological objections to exploration were to the spirit of the time real enough; and those who urged them were in many cases sincerely intent on safeguarding religious faith. When it was finally brought home to these churchmen that their negative attitude could no longer be maintained, there must have intervened an agonizing period of reappraisal such as had often been imposed upon theologians after the break-down of established philosophies or conventional cosmologies. We can only speculate as to the outcome, but it seems not improbable that these religiously concerned people began to search diligently for something to replace the old values and securities of the middle ages. It may well be that these conservative church-

6. Matt. 28:19.
7. Cosmas' work is entitled *Christianike Topographia*; text in *PG*, 88, 9–476. (Cosmas Indicopleustes means "Cosmas who sailed to India.") Cf. J. Fiske, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 265.
8. Cf. J. Fiske, *op. cit.*, p. 314.

men by their very concern for the abiding realities of the medieval world contributed more to the reform movements of the sixteenth century than those ecclesiastics who enthusiastically welcomed the new science and the discoveries of the explorers with little regard for the church's doctrinal embarrassments.

II

On the other side in this issue were many churchmen, some in very high office, who gladly welcomed the new knowledge that made discovery possible. Nor were they by any means startled by the sudden discovery of the long-rejected antipodal world. In point of fact some of them took the lead in making such discoveries possible. It was a cardinal of the Roman Church, Pierre d'Ailly (1350–1420), the author of a treatise on geography, *Imago Mundi*,[9] who convinced Columbus that it was possible to sail across the Atlantic on a continuous voyage that would ultimately lead him to the Indies. It was none other than the Grand Master of the Order of Christ, Henry the Navigator, who determined with all the help that science could supply to know what might lie beyond earth's remotest bounds. To this end he appealed to his order "for funds for the worthy purpose of advancing the interests of science, converting the heathen and winning a commercial empire for Portugal."[10]

Great credit for contributing to the discovery of America must be given to the prior of a Franciscan monastery, Juan Perez, for his championship of what were generally regarded as the chimerical views of Christopher Columbus. In the quiet retreat of Father Perez' monastery at Palos, Columbus finally gained a genuine hearing for his plan to reach the Indies by sailing westward across the Atlantic. Furthermore, it was the monks at Palos who arranged an all-important gathering of church dignitaries at Granada where Mendoza, the archbishop of Toledo and primate of Spain, was induced to use his poweful influence to persuade Queen Isabella to provide the ships and men for Columbus' projected voyage.[11]

All this vigorous support by the clergy of apparently chimerical schemes is explained by the fact that Columbus was a man of mystical vision and always presented his project as part of a divine plan for enlarging the bounds of Christendom.[12] When finally through his efforts a new inhabited world was brought into view, the church in Spain by its identification with Columbus' project was spiritually prepared, as it were, to embark upon a great missionary campaign to bring these new people within the Christian fold. It was also inclined to agree with the prevalent Spanish opinion that the discovery was a reward to Spain for its vigorous support of the Christian cause. This general opinion was clearly expressed by one of the most popular poets of the day, Giuliano Dati, who after due thanks "to the illustrious discoverer Columbus," reserved the "greater thanks to the supreme

9. Cf. S. E. Morison, *Admiral of the Ocean Sea* (Boston, 1942), p. 93.
10. Cf. J. Fiske, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 320.
11. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 413.
12. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 416.

God, who is making new realms to be conquered for thee [Spain] and for himself and vouchsafes to thee to be at once strong and pious."[13]

No longer are there any troublesome questions about the improbability of God's leaving a people separated for centuries from the means of salvation; no longer is there fear to penetrate into mysteries beyond human understanding; from pious monarchs down to humble cabin-boys all theological doubts are dispelled by the exhilarating thought that God had been holding in reserve new worlds to conquer for the kingdom that served him best. Both Isabella and Ferdinand were certain that Columbus' discovery was God's reward to them for the capture of Granada, the last Islamic stronghold in Western Europe, as well as for the expulsion of the Jews from Spain and the harsh measures they had taken for the extirpation of heresy. And with this view conquistador and missionary were in hearty agreement as they prepared to exploit and convert the new-found lands and peoples.

III

The exuberant mood which led to the immediate colonization of the barbaric world by Europeans could not be confined to the Iberian peninsula; in a very brief time it spread across Western Europe and fired men's ambitions to perfect a new and better future for all mankind. This in turn led to more daring thinking and a greater freedom of expression than was customary in medieval Europe.

The era that preceded the discovery of America seems to have been very wary of new ideas, and would have resented the suggestion:

> There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio,
> Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.[14]

Roger Bacon's fanciful endeavour to outline a better future led to years of imprisonment, and Petrarch's attempt to enlarge the intellectual horizon of his time gained for him the title of wizard. But with a new world of wonders being proclaimed by such responsible reporters as Peter Martyr of *De Orbe Novo* fame or Richard Eaton in his *Decades*,[15] it became manifestly impossible to prevent men from dreaming dreams and seeing visions of a new and better society than mankind had ever envisaged before. The challenge was first accepted by Sir Thomas More, who in writing *Utopia* started a vogue of imaginary "brave new worlds" that has continued down to our own time. "Utopia" or "no-where place" was suggested to More while reading a little book called *Cosmographie Introductio*, which described the four voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. More selects one of the characters in this book to serve as the spokesman for a new world order. The narrator tells us that "among Utopians all things being common, every man hath abundance of everything . . . ," and that he holds "well with Plato . . . that all men should have and enjoy equal positions of wealth and commodities. . . . For where every man, under certain titles and pretences, draineth and plucketh to himself as

13. *Ibid.*, p. 450.
14. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Scene 5.
15. Cf. Peter Martyr, *De Orbe Novo, etc.* (French tr. by Paul Gaffarel, Paris, 1907); R. Eaton, *The Decades of the newe world* (ed. Edward Arber, Birmingham, 1885).

much as he can, so that a few divide among themselves all the whole riches, . . . there to the residual is left lack and poverty."[16] As one reader of *Utopia* has exclaimed, this "is almost the voice of Karl Marx. . . . It remains as contemporary as a planned economy and the welfare state."[17]

What is even more surprising is that More, a loyal son of the medieval church, should predict the spirit of modern day sectarianism, since in *Utopia* religion is voluntary and "no prayers be used [in church] but such as every man may boldly pronounce without offending any sect."[18] Las Casas, the famous Spanish missionary, also indulged in utopian visions, dreaming "of an ideal colony, peopled by perfect Christians labouring for the conversion of model Indians,"[19] a dream partly realized in the Jesuit colony of Paraguay. A consequence of these dreams was the founding of new religious orders dedicated to foreign missions among far-away peoples; another was the attempt to create in the forests of the new world new Zions based upon the principles of reformed or "purified" churches.

In the same category as utopianism was a tendency on the part of the early explorers and missionaries to idealize the American Indian. It seems fair to say that this Indian of fancy's creation has had an even more revolutionary influence than utopian visions upon western civilization. A mythical Indian first began to take form through Columbus' desire to impress the importance of his discoveries upon the Spanish sovereigns. In trying to do so he described the primitives of Cuba as "very gentle, without knowledge of evil, neither killing nor stealing. . . . In all the world there is not a better people or a better country; they love their neighbours as themselves and they have the sweetest and gentlest way of speaking in the world and always with a smile."[20] With even more fervour Las Casas declared: "All these infinite peoples were created by God and most simple of all others, without malice or duplicity, most obedient and faithful to their rulers, whom they serve; the most humble, patient, loving, peaceful and docile people, without contentions or tumults; neither factious nor quarrelsome, without hatred or desire for revenge more than any people in the world."[21]

Reports like these led not only to the writing of fanciful utopias, but also to serious or semi-serious books on political economy. Rousseau's *Le Contrat Social*, the text book of the French Revolution, drew its inspiration from *le bon sauvage*; this is also partly true of Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme* which contributed so much to the romantic movement of the nineteenth century,[22] a movement which gave to Christianity the greatest territorial expansion in all its long history.[23]

16. More, *Utopia* (Everyman edition), p. 44.
17. Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization*: Part VI, *The Reformation* (New York, 1957), p. 555.
18. Quoted from Will Durant, *op. cit.*, p. 554.
19. Cf. F. A. MacNutt, *Bartholomew de las Casas* (New York and London, 1909), p. vi.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Cf. Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, Bk. IV.
23. Cf. K. S. Latourette, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*, 2nd ed. (New York and London, 1941), Vol. IV, Chap. I.

IV

Such were the contributions of the idealists and dreamers to the thought and culture of modern Europe. But there was also the contribution of entrepreneurs and shopkeepers. Their opportunity came through what has been designated as the "open frontier."[24]

One of the most significant facts about fifteenth-century Europe was its fortress-like life; on one side were the Turks, on the other the Barbary pirates. Within this beleaguered fortress, comprising an area of about 3,750,000 square miles, life was static, with well-defined classes, and a population of some 100,000,000 people was continually pressing on the means of subsistence.[25] Although the old manorial economy had been greatly threatened by the sudden depopulation brought about by the Black Death, yet it was still being buttressed by harsh legislation which forbade artisans from moving about. Then came the miracle; a way of escape from the rigid caste system was opened up by the discovery of a new world. The decline of the manorial system was now greatly hastened by the expanded trade of the Atlantic powers that followed shortly upon the discoveries of the mariners; and this in turn helped the yeomanry and peasants to get out of the hands of their overlords, as they moved steadily into the world of shops and warehouses and began to develop "a passion for bourgeois comfort."[26] It was not long before the shopkeepers struck upon the idea of uniting their savings in great corporations for the exploration of new-found lands. The stockholders, however, were not shopkeepers only, but came from the most diverse groups of society. Thus was created a new fraternity in which class barriers began to disappear. In the London company incorporated to develop Virginia there were "besides earls, bishops, knights and gentlemen, plain commoners, merchants, tailors, stationers, shoemakers etc. and two women."[27]

Lure of profits no doubt played the dominant rôle in creating this unusual fraternity; yet there was also mixed with the profit motive a spirit of service, directed either towards the welfare of the aborigines in the new world, or towards national interests in the old. So sincerely was it believed that a joint-stock company might serve a beneficient purpose that shares in common stock were actually advertised from the pulpits of the churches in England. "Before it was anything else," says one student of the Virginia Company's records, "the Virginia Company was a Christian enterprise."[28]

24. On the influence of the frontier see F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (New York, 1906), *passim.*

25. Cf. W. P. Webb, *The Great Frontier* (Boston, 1932), p. 142.

26. Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1933), p. 20.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

28. A. L. Maycock, *Nicholas Ferrar of Little Gidding* (London, 1938), p. 87, speaking of some of the directors of the Virginia Company, says: "To have neglected the spiritual or pastoral aspect of their work in Virginia would have been a gross and sinful violation of their trust and a grave misuse of their authority. To the truth of this there is ample witness in the Court Books."

Certainly the Massachusetts Bay Company regarded its spiritual purpose as primary, even though the appetite for profits grew with increasing dividends, and Bible and ledger became inextricably commingled in the exploitation of the new world.

Accordingly, there arose in the age of discovery a more dynamic imperialism than mankind had yet witnessed. A famous German economist, Sombart, has tried to explain the dynamic of this new imperialism by reducing it "to the terms of the everlasting struggle among human societies over feeding places on the wide surface of the earth and over the distribution of the world's natural resources."[29] The Beards in their justly famous history, *The Rise of American Civilization*, though much impressed by the Sombart thesis, make the reservation that "the story of human migration cannot all be told in the terms of commerce, profits, conquest and exploration."[30] Apart from the Roman Catholic missions and the Calvinistic belief in destiny, both of which added new forces to the development of western imperialism, there was the tremendous uplift of the open frontier, ever beckoning adventurous souls forward to the land of Eldorado. Eldorado, however, was a lodestar that attracted far more than mere gold-seekers and those in search of perpetual youth. As already observed, it attracted those concerned with new and better world orders and reformed churches, while even those who stayed at home could not fail to feel the contagion of the optimism of those who were venturing forth with great expectations; this very spirit of optimism and feeling of freedom gave to western civilization a dynamic quality that has only recently begun to wane.[31]

V

In the field of religion this new quality became most evident in missionary enterprises. At the time of the discovery of America, missionary work had about come to an end; Europe with the exception of Lapland had been evangelized and religious orders with missionary motives seemed doomed to extinction. Then came the challenge of the new world, and an amazing response on the part of the medieval church at a time when the papacy was under most corrupt leadership and was soon to be shaken to its depths by the Protestant revolt. The dates speak for themselves. As early as May, 1493, Alexander VI created a department of Indian affairs, at the head of which he placed Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca, the archdeacon of Seville. On September 6 in the same year the papacy issued a bull, *Dudum siquidem omnes*, calling attention to the need for missionary effort to justify the occupation of the new country by Europeans. To superintend missionary work, a Franciscan friar, Bernardo Bayle, was selected by the pope and given the title of Apostolic Vicar for the Indies.[32] In 1524 there was organized the Council of the Indies, one of whose most outstanding members was

29. Quoted by C. and M. Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
31. On the genesis of modern dynamism, cf. W. P. Webb, *op. cit.*, p. 140f.
32. J. Fiske, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 460.

Bartholomew de las Casas; another was the famous chronicler, Peter Martyr, whose writings kept a large reading public in Europe acutely conscious of the larger world in which they now lived.[33]

Such a vigorous response to the challenge of America was not made without some preparation. Discoveries in the thirteenth century, and particularly the voyages of the Polos, had given new currency to a "religious utopia of the *Regnum Dei*, . . . an abstract ideal of the mystics of ancient Europe,"[34] which had for centuries been part of the folk-lore of medieval Europe. It was this ideal that had imbued men like Raymond Lull with a desire to convert the Asian peoples who were becoming more intimately known to western Europe. Columbus was not unaware of this missionary urge; moreover, he had the conversion of the Indies in mind even while seeking a sponsor for his projected voyage across the Atlantic.

The spiritual Franciscans were from the first word of discovery ready to proceed to the new world, as were also other mendicant orders. Nor was it long before new orders arose, particularly adapted to frontier outpost conditions. In these first days the Roman Catholic Church far outdistanced the Protestant churches, partly because the latter were long delayed through controversy and unsettlement in working out a philosophy of missions, and partly because the challenge of the Reformation forced the Roman Catholic states "to develop the missionary state an an answer to this threat."[35]

The ecclesiastical demands of the new world became so pressing in the seventeenth century as to compel Pope Gregory XV to create the *Congregatio de propaganda fide* (1622);[36] under its auspices colleges were set up in the Americas to train missionaries for work both at home and abroad. This new activity led to much coming and going in church circles; councils were frequently summoned to deal with the transformation in religious institutions, and unusual experiments in religious expression. These transformations and experiments must be given a large place in any study of the religious background of the churches of the Americas, including Canada.

33. A. P. Newton, *op. cit.*, p. 99, says Peter Martyr (1457–1526) "fulfilled a purpose similar to that of the foreign correspondence of a great newspaper today."

34. *History of Religion in the New World.* Studies presented at the Conference on the History of Religion in the New World during Colonial Times (Washington, D.C., 1958), p. 66.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

36. For the origins of the Propaganda Congregation, cf. *Catholic Encyclopedia* (Special Edition, 1913), Vol. XII, p. 456f.

Christianity and the Counter-Attack from the East

W. S. TAYLOR

THE startling challenge presented to us today by a revived Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam is evidence of something significant happening in the relations between Christianity and the great religions of Asia. A few years ago, students sometimes questioned the value of required courses in the non-Christian religions; today they are aware of the new challenge which these religions present to Christianity, and eager for guidance. It is true that some of the most provocative thinking on this matter has been done initially by people who are not Christian theologians. However, the Church is becoming increasingly aware of the problem; and the rank and file of Church people are looking more and more anxiously to the Church for guidance in how to think about the growing claims of other religions. What guidance are we to give?

Something significant had already happened when L. P. Jacks could remind us, thirty-two years ago, that the British state had several hundred million subjects in India alone "whose religious liberty it guarantees,"[1] so that the traditional title of the Head of the State, Defender of the Faith, had already lost much of its point. Dr. Jacks wrote long before India had achieved its independence. Today, as a Republic within the Commonwealth, she has a right to establish Hinduism as the state religion if she wants to, and to close her doors to Christianity. Pakistan has already established Islam as the state religion of the theocratic Muslim state and, quite within her rights, has required that some knowledge of Islam be taught to Muslim children in all schools, including Christian schools.[2] The Prime Minister of Burma has proposed that Buddhism be the official religion of that country.[3] We support their right as members of the Commonwealth to do so. What then happens to the rallying call of a previous generation of Christians: "The evangelization of the world in this generation"? As Canadians and Christians, should we publicly be supporters of the right of such states to limit the spread of Christianity, but privately be supporters of projects to convert them to Christianity?

1. L. P. Jacks, "East and West," *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1928.
2. Cf. J. W. Sweetman, "Problems and Prospects in West Pakistan," *International Review of Missions*, July, 1954, p. 301.
3. Reported by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "World Church News" (28 May 1960).

This may sound to some like an academic question; but it is not an academic question to some of our churchpeople, and it is not an academic question to young Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims in Asia. The latter are very sensitive about anything that suggests a belittling of their religions. A very suggestive incident, illustrating this feeling, occurred when Queen Elizabeth visited Ceylon in 1954. The columnist Janus, writing in *Time and Tide*, had said that though the Queen was regarded as an Anglican in England and a Presbyterian in Scotland, she could hardly be expected to consider herself a Buddhist in Ceylon. The Buddhists in Ceylon promptly asked why she should not, and threatened to boycott her visit because of this and other supposed slights to their religion.[4] The incident may seem odd, but it is symptomatic of a serious situation. As a leader of one of the younger Churches has said, speaking of this problem of the Christian attitude to the non-Christian religions: "These questions may seem academic to some people; for us they are a matter of life and death."[5]

They are becoming much more than academic questions, also, for the ordinary member of our Churches, for two good reasons. In the first place he has an obscure but nagging feeling that the Church has let him down in some way. He attends meetings of UNESCO and related organizations, and notes that Buddhists, Hindus, and Muslims are all accepted happily on a basis of equality in a brotherhood of people dedicated to the common task of relieving distress and promoting understanding. He feels, as P. D. Devanandan has said, that "we are entering an epoch in world history when religious differences are no longer regarded as fundamentally divisive."[6] But when he turns to the Church he finds that it considers the Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim unsuitable for inclusion in the brotherhood of the Church till they have given up some of the distinctive attitudes they prize. He cannot help wondering if the Church is lagging behind non-religious bodies in showing a Christian spirit. In the second place he is becoming increasingly aware of the claim made by both Buddhists and Hindus, to the effect that they provide the truly universal point of view in religion, and that they alone can provide a hope for world peace. Over against the Christian claim for the universality of Christ, he faces claims like that of Swami Akhilananda, that "it was Sri Ramakrishna who actually first demonstrated the full universality of religion."[7] Over against the Christian claim that Christianity is the basis of peace, he finds Buddhists claiming that "Christianity has had its chance and has failed."[8] Speaking about a world conference of Buddhists held in Ceylon in 1950, the Attorney-General of Burma claimed: "Buddhism alone can provide the way. . . . It was the

4. Cf. E. J. Jurji, "The Great Religions and International Affairs," *Theology Today*, July, 1955, p. 173.
5. Cf. R. H. L. Slater, "Christian Attitudes to Other Religions," *Canadian Journal of Theology*, October, 1956, p. 215.
6. P. D. Devanandan, "The Christian Attitude and Approach to Non-Christian Religions," *International Review of Missions*, April, 1952, p. 178.
7. Cf. Swami Akhilananda, *The Hindu View of Christ* (New York, 1959).
8. A. J. Eastman, "The Sixth Buddhist Council," *International Review of Missions*, July, 1954, p. 281.

unanimous belief of all those people present there that Buddhism is the only ideology which can give peace to the world."[9] The Sixth Great Council of Buddhism, held near Rangoon from 1954–56, was "the first step in offering Buddhism to the world as its only hope for peace."[10] The Christian has an uneasy conscience about the seeming failure of Christianity to prevent our world from getting into its present disastrous predicament, and cannot help wondering if there is some truth in these claims. Because of his democratic tradition and his belief in the inviolable right of each individual to practice and profess his own faith in his own way, the western Christian cannot help being impressed by the apparent tolerance of men like Sir S. Radhakrishnan, "the Ambassador-General of Indian Culture,"[11] and by the claims of men like the Prime Minister of Burma, who expressed the Buddhist view as follows: "People may profess any religion they like, but if their moral conduct is such as is in conformity with the principle of Buddha's teachings, or in other words, they lead the Buddhist way of life, then there will be everlasting peace in the world. . . ."[12]

Faced with claims like these, the individual Christian has a right to look to the Church for guidance. Will the Church be able to give him the guidance he needs, until it has given much thoughtful study to the problem? The situation we face is a new situation in the modern history of the Church, as Kraemer points out:

> For the first time since the Constantine victory in A.D. 312 and its consequences, the Christian Church is heading toward a real and spiritual encounter with the great non-Christian religions. . . . Up till now the other [than Islam] great non-Christian religions and the Christian Church have, so to say, only met in passing. Notwithstanding brilliant individual efforts, a real meeting in openness and fairness has never yet taken place. The great meeting of the Christian Church as a whole with the great religions . . . is still awaiting us.[13]

In attempting to grapple with the problem, the theologian faces serious difficulties, as the current literature on the subject amply demonstrates. The subject matter is peculiarly elusive. Time and again the theologian grasps at a precise statement, only to find that he is clutching shadows. The claims of the different religions seem often to be on different planes, their statements not strictly commensurable. Discussions of the relations between Christianity and non-Christian religions easily lapse into generalities which are either unfair or futile. Yet the effort to clarify these relationships must continue. The difficulty of the task is more than matched by the urgency of the need.

Arnold Toynbee suggests that, in order to make effective progress in the comparative study of Christianity and other faiths, we may have to avoid

9. Quoted by A. C. Bouquet, *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions* (New York, 1958), p. 289.
10. A. J. Eastman, *art. cit.*, p. 284.
11. W. Perston, "Christian Theology and Vedanta," *International Review of Missions*, April, 1955, p. 153.
12. Quoted by Bouquet, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
13. H. Kraemer, *Religion and the Christian Faith* (Philadelphia, 1956), p. 20.

general comparisons of belief and practice, concentrating instead on specific problems in the human situation.[14] This method may help to sort out the intricate interrelationships into recognizable patterns, and to isolate a few significant issues where similarities and differences can be more clearly seen.

"A time of genuine religious conversations is beginning," says Martin Buber, on the basis, "not of an identical content of faith which is alleged to be found in all religions, but of the situation, of anguish and expectation."[15] "Of anguish and expectation"; perhaps this situation—more particularly, the anguish of frustrated expectation—will provide a useful initial problem on which to base comparisons. "Among all the enemies of the human race perhaps the worst are fear, frustration and resentment."[16] If we deal initially with frustration, we are therefore dealing with a problem of importance.

What have the major religions to say about frustration? They are all deeply concerned about it—naturally so, says Toynbee, since the great religions "appeared at a moment when mankind had received surprising and humiliating setbacks in its endeavours."[17] Let us take a very quick look at some of the major religions from this standpoint.

Buddhism

Although the stories of Gautama's early life are known to have been put down in writing only several hundred years after his death, and although many improbable accretions have crept in, the main outlines of the story are simple and are generally accepted. He was born into the family of a ruler whose kingdom lay on the borders of India and Nepal. A wise man foretold that he would become either a great religious ascetic or a great ruler. The king asked what the things were that would drive the boy into religious asceticism, hoping to guard the boy against them. The sage replied that it would happen when he saw a decrepit old man, a man whose body was foul with sores, a dead body, and a shaven-headed, ash-smeared mendicant. To protect the boy from ever seeing these, he was brought up in the seclusion of the court, in pampered and protected luxury, with all signs of disease and death carefully excluded. When as a young man he was at last allowed to ride out publicly, troops were sent ahead through the city to remove all people showing signs of old age, disease, death, or religious asceticism. In spite of these precautions, when Gautama rode through the city, he did see the four traditional Buddhist messengers of disaster: a decrepit old man, a man whose body was foul with sores, a dead man, and a shaven-haired ascetic. Shocked to the depths of his soul by these evidences of the tragic end to which the promise of life must come, the young man renounced his comfort, wealth, and title, joined a group of ascetics, and set out on his pilgrimage to find peace of mind. He found it at last in the enlightenment which came to him as he sat under the Bo tree. The premise

14. Cf. A. J. Toynbee, *Christianity among the Religions of the World* (London, 1958).
15. M. Buber, *Between Man and Man* (New York, 1947), p. 7.
16. S. Neill, *A Genuinely Human Existence* (New York, 1959), p. 190.
17. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

on which the whole enlightenment is based is that men universally suffer on account of the frustration of desire.

Hinduism

The Bhagavadgita is the best-loved part of Hindu religious literature. It "has become the most popular, widely memorized, authoritative statement of the basic guiding principles of Indian religious life."[18] The story starts when Arjuna rides out in the early morning, on his chariot, between the two armies which face each other on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Every avenue of action open to him leads to suffering and tragedy. As he looks at the ranks of the enemy he sees that they are filled with his own relatives and friends. If he leads his army into battle, brother will die at the hands of brother and friend at the hands of friend. No matter which side wins, the only certain outcome will be suffering, tragedy, and sorrow. If he refuses to lead his army into battle, his own family and followers will face inescapable persecution and death. What is he to do? Has life nothing to offer, in the end, but a tragic dilemma in which hope turns to despair and love is crowned with sorrow? The driver of his chariot is Krishna, an avatar of Vishnu. Arjuna turns to him for help. The Bhagavadgita is the advice Krishna gives Arjuna on how to escape the inevitable frustrations and sorrows of life.

Islam

To understand the concern of Islam with the problem of frustration, one need only remember that the Muslim calendar begins from the failure of Mohammed's mission in Mecca and his flight to Medina, not from the date of the first revelation. Nor can there be any doubt about the reality of the frustration which Mohammed faced at this time. He left Mecca as a genuine fugitive—taking steps to confuse his enemies, hiding in a cave till the danger of capture had passed—and not as a general conducting a strategic retreat as a temporary tactical device. One must remember also the great concern of Islam with death and the Last Days, when the frustration of all human ambitions will stand revealed in the fierce light of the will of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate, the sole arbiter of human destiny.

Christianity

Christianity, like Islam, has to be understood in terms of the historic events out of which it arose. In a journal like this, it is sufficient merely to mention the centrality for Christianity of the tragedy of the Cross, the way in which the shame of the Cross became the boast of the Gospel, the way in which Christ insisted that a cross must be a normal part of a Christian's life, and the way in which the meaning of life was altered by Christ's victory over the final frustration of death. One premise of the Gospel is the inevitable frustration of man's efforts to achieve salvation by his own resources.

Cursory comments like these are sufficient to show that Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam are like Christianity at least in this, that they all speak to a

18. H. Zimmer, *Philosophies of India* (New York, 1951), p. 380.

common predicament of man, which has frustration as one of its inescapable features. Here is a situation about which genuine religious conversations between them may at least begin, though any progress in conversation is bound to lead into more subtle and significant questions. One must go on to ask questions like these: What kinds of frustration is each religion primarily concerned with? In what areas of life is the most significant frustration to be found? What is responsible for producing this frustration? What are the specific remedies proposed for frustration?

When one goes on to consider specific questions like these, the subtle interweaving of similarities and dissimilarities becomes more difficult to disentangle. It is in the process of disentangling them, however, that the most helpful insights will be gained. Early Buddhism, for instance, is concerned with the immediate frustrations which everyone must endure in the course of normal daily life, rather than with death or with a judgment beyond death, while Islam is concerned with the frustrations made clear at the last judgment, rather than with those of daily life. Zen Buddhism is concerned with frustrations inherent in the nature of understanding; the Judaic-Christian tradition is concerned more with frustrations in the accomplishment of purpose. Or consider the matter of responsibility for frustration. In early Buddhism, and in much modern Buddhism, the responsibility for frustration lies squarely on the nature of man; in Hinduism it is due to the operation of an eternal law before which even the gods are well-nigh helpless; in Islam it is due solely to the inscrutable will of the merciful and compassionate Allah; and would we be far wrong in suggesting that, in Christianity, it is not due to any of these, but to the continuing encounter between Almighty God and men whom he has created with the capacity to disobey him?

In two aspects of their treatment of frustration, the religions we have been considering show considerable agreement. Both of them have to do with the human factor in the situation. They speak almost with one voice in saying that the chief root of frustration lies in human egoism, however much they may differ, both among themselves and within themselves, about the particular forms this egoism takes. On this point they each talk a language which all can understand. They show remarkable agreement also in maintaining that the way to overcome frustration, as far as human effort can go, is by practising self-denial. Frustration cannot be escaped, but must be overcome, and the only way of overcoming involuntary frustration is to adopt a voluntary program of planned self-denials. So far the religions which we are considering are agreed; differences come with respect to the kind of program to be adopted, and its aim.

It was said above that the major religions could at least understand each other when speaking about the means of overcoming frustration, "so far as human effort can go." How far is this? It is at this point that the most significant differences appear; and the differences between the major religions are complicated by considerable differences within some religions,

notably Buddhism and Hinduism. Early Buddhism and much modern Buddhism maintain that human effort can do what is necessary; Islam maintains that human effort can do no more than keep one in the theocratic community of obedience which has special grounds for hope in the ultimate mercy of Allah. One form of Hinduism also says that human effort can do all that is necessary, provided that it operates strictly within the appropriate Dharma, while another form of Hinduism comes quite close to the Christian position in its insistence upon the need to rely wholly on the grace of God—though even here the differences in the total patterns of associated ideas are so great that Rudolf Otto, after his visit to India, was led to alter his earlier statements about their similarity.[19] The concept of the *bodhisattva* in Mahayana Buddhism, with its magnificent ideal of sacrifice, probably comes closer than does any other religious insight to the Christian concept of the sacrifice of Christ, though even here significant differences appear. The voluntary sacrifice of the *bodhisattva*, with its wonderful sense of compassion for others, though an instance of an eternal principle, is basically a personal achievement, setting up an ideal for men to copy; in Christian thought, on the contrary, the sacrifice of Christ is something undertaken by God in which human initiative has no effective part, and which man cannot hope to copy as it is a once-for-all action undertaken by God. In this assurance of God's initiative, Christianity finds its major answer to man's frustration.

Even a brief and superficial examination of one particular problem, such as we have tried to make, does help to bring into sharper focus some of the similarities and differences between the major religions. To this extent, at least, Toynbee seems to be right in saying that it will be of value to concentrate on specific features of the human situation. But, however we undertake it, there can be no serious question about the need for a renewed study of the problems presented to Christianity by the renewed counter-attack from the East. The literatures of the revived non-Christian religions are becoming available in readily accessible form to the ordinary Christian. The man, who had assumed his Christianity much as he had assumed his citizenship, because he had been born in a country isolated from the influences of other religions, in a particular geographic area, and because he had been born into a family which had transmitted to him responsibilities in a Christian community, is increasingly going to demand the right as a mature individual to choose the religion he wishes. The encounter with non-Christian faiths is ceasing to be a distant problem on the missionary frontiers and is becoming a local concern of every Christian community. Arnold Toynbee in his great *Study of History* has argued that it is the disturbed periods of history that are the really creative periods, and Kraemer has pointed out that the one previous period when Christianity met in direct encounter with aggressive non-Christian faiths, in the first few centuries of the Christian era, was the period of the great formulation of Christian belief.

19. I refer to statements made at the Jerusalem meeting of the International Missionary Council.

If then, as Toynbee again seems to suggest,[20] the encounter between Christianity and the revived non-Christian religions is to be one of the most crucial features of the last half of the twentieth century, as the encounter of Christianity and science was of the first half, we should prepare for it with expectation rather than apprehension. "One feels that the real encounter between Christianity and these ancient faiths is just coming," said Dr. E. H. Johnson of the Board of Overseas Missions of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, after a recent visit to Asia, "and the Christian Church will need to prepare for it by deeper understanding and appreciation of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these re-invigorated faiths."[21] It may require some resorting and reformulating of contemporary Christian thought. But prepare for it we must.

20. E.g., in "Religion and the Rise of Western Culture," *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1950, p. 3.
21. Quoted in the Student Christian Movement Graduate Register *Newsletter* (1960, no. 1).

Book Reviews

God's Image and Man's Imagination. By Erdman Harris. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited), 1959. Pp. xvi, 236. $4.00.

"Images of God which stimulate the imagination—that is what this book is about," says Dr. Harris, who was brought up in Toronto and is now a school-teacher in Connecticut and a lecturer at Yale Divinity School. He wants us to consider the variety of ways in which men have thought of God, and to this end he gives us some thought on the subject of theism, conducts us rapidly through the Old and New Testaments and the history of the Church, makes a brief survey of modern cults and "Christian deviations," and shows the relation between religious ideas and moral standards—and between religious ideas and tastes in religious music. The argument ranges so far that it cannot go very deep. Yet, having in mind Dr. Harris's purpose, this does not matter very much. The conversational style of the book and its load of comments, reminiscences, stories, and apt quotations together add up to a consistent and fairly satisfying whole.

The consistency is beyond doubt. Throughout, Dr. Harris shows that his God is one conceived in "the image of a Super-Personal Power, who can be thought of in terms of the best we know." Since he equates this God with the nature of Jesus as people came to know that nature in the days of his earthly existence, Dr. Harris believes that faith in the presence of such a God is the prime message that Christianity exists to proclaim. But this is where the book fails to be wholly satisfying. For if, as we are told, "we derive the notion of a good Deity from a recognition of the promptings toward the ideal within the human heart," is there any real need to have faith in anything else except the human heart and the ideals which are generated within it? Christianity, on this showing, seems to be only one more image of God which happens to live up (so far!) to "the best we know." But then, what is really valuable in Christianity is not its intrinsic nature or its unique message, but its power to prompt us to ideals. In fact, we are likely to lay down this book murmuring the lines of Ella Wheeler Wilcox,

> So many gods,
> So many creeds,
> So many paths that wind and wind—
> When just the art of being kind
> Is all this old world needs.

And that is not at all what the author intended.

Kenneth Hamilton

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Problems of Religious Knowledge. By PETER MUNZ. London: S.C.M. Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 253. $5.00.

THIS is another volume in the "Library of Philosophy and Theology" published by the S.C.M. Press. Like many of its predecessors, it is written from the standpoint of the contemporary school of analytical philosophy. In the words of the author, who is Senior Lecturer in History at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, the purpose of the book is to explore "the question what religious statements are about and what would have to be the case for them to be true" (p. 7). He points out that there is a great deal of religious argument going on today, and that this argument is apt to be futile as long as we lack an agreed criterion of truth and falsehood in religious propositions.

The thesis of the book is that there is only one kind of knowledge, natural or reasonable knowledge, but that this knowledge has to do with two different pictures of the world, the positive (scientific) and the symbolic (religious). The two pictures exist, not because there are two worlds, but because there are two modes of perceiving the one world. The positive picture is derived from empirical observation, while the symbol picture has to do with feeling-states. We cannot talk about feeling-states in the way that we can talk about tables and chairs, because feeling-states cannot be located in space and time; one's feeling-state is one's way of being, or mode of existence; it is how one feels oneself to be. While we cannot talk about it in the usual way, we can symbolize it; we can indicate a thing or perform an action which can be called the symbol of the feeling-state.

In the positive picture the criterion of truth is that the alleged fact, or its consequences, can be observed in space and time. In the symbol picture the criterion is that the alleged indicated thing or act is a symbol of a feeling-state, and that "one has a state of lucidity upon designating it a symbol" (p. 58). Our intellectual world is such that the positive picture has taken over the whole field, with the result that the world of feeling-states and the symbol picture, so familiar to our forefathers, have become alien to us. But there is really no reason for assuming that the one criterion is any more absolute than the other.

The symbol picture is made up of rites and myths which are, therefore, the primary data of religious thought. Beliefs, dogmas, theology, are all theories about these rites and myths. The symbol picture so composed can be roughly equated to revelation in the sense of the given; theology is an interpretation of the given in this sense. The rites and myths that make up the symbol picture are very similar in all religions. Where religions differ is in their interpretations of the symbol picture—*i.e.*, in their theologies. Just as the scientist brings to his interpretation of the positive picture certain *a priori* concepts, like causality, so the theologian interprets the symbol picture with the help of *a priori* concepts, the most important of which is eternity. Just as the scientist must first decide which interpretation of causality he is going to use, so the theologian has to begin by determining which of the various

meanings of "eternity" he is going to adopt; he then must test the truth of statements in which he uses the concept of eternity by referring them to the symbol picture.

For anyone who is interested in contemporary analytical philosophy and in the rôle of myth and symbol in religious thought, this book is required reading. It is full of subtle reasoning and provocative conclusions. On the other hand, it might be objected that the author's conclusions are not only unproved, but far from clear. The relation between the symbol and the feeling-state, the part that is played in the criterion of truth by the feeling-state and by the concept of eternity respectively, the meaning of "feeling-state" and of "eternity"—these and other problems are left unresolved, at least for one reader. Finally, the Christian will object to the author's denial of the importance of the historical, as distinct from the mythological, in Christian beliefs.

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An Introduction to Natural Theology. By M. R. Holloway, S. J. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. (Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited), 1959. Pp. xxviii, 492. $6.25.

Depth psychology, modern existentialism, and atheistic materialism bring again to the fore the mystery of the human person and its difficult insertion in an apparently hostile universe. Although Jung could say "that most of his patients had but one problem to solve—that of relating their personal and solitary existence to an Absolute," present-day philosophers are not inclined to substantiate the existence of such a personal Absolute and thus dissipate the anxiety and doubt that gnaw at the heart of our contemporaries. Present-day thinkers seem to have lost faith in the power of human reason to reach a knowledge of anything immaterial, let alone of God and divine things.

This book, written for students in philosophy, comes at an opportune time. Its purpose is to give a clear and objective presentation of a knowledge of God, based on a metaphysical analysis of self-evident principles of the natural order. It is not a book of apologetics or a dialogue with contemporary philosophers over the problems of theistic philosophy, but a positive quest for truth concerning the existence and nature of God in the light of natural evidence, along lines defined by St. Thomas Aquinas. As such, it should help the men of our generation in their search for an absolute truth amidst the uncertainties of contemporary thought.

An Introduction to Natural Theology comprises thirteen chapters, followed by six appendices. (These appendices, dealing with invalid philosophical proofs of God's existence and with atheistic objections, would have broken the trend of the author's demonstration, had they been inserted in his text. His method is a credit to the author's pedagogy and to his deep

concern for a serene and objective presentation of the truth for itself.) Four chapters discuss the problem of the demonstrability and the demonstration of the existence of God while the remaining chapters probe into his nature and perfections, in the light of the very evidence that served to establish his existence.

Father Holloway introduces his subject by an analysis of natural theology, its nature and characteristics, in opposition to sacred theology and religion. Natural theology is part of the science of metaphysics, and is therefore concerned with God in so far as God can be reached through the *existence of being*, which is the formal object of metaphysics. In this connection, the author has recaptured the basic intuition of the metaphysics of St. Thomas, which centuries of pseudo-Thomism had transformed into an essentialist package of abstractions about things. The Angelic Doctor's ontology is an existential one, since existence, the very act of the substance, is the core of the reality attained by the second operation of the mind—*i.e.*, by judgment. It is because of this primary interest in existence that metaphysics can pursue it, through existent beings, to its very source and fountainhead, *Ipsum Esse Subsistens.*

The author shows throughout his book that this existential notion of being in St. Thomas is the very key to his valid proofs for the existence of God, whereas an essential notion of being has brought nothing but confusion in man's quest for God. This point is of primary importance in the present-day dialogue with existentialists. The character of human existence and the solitude of our human person come from the fact that existence is limited, restricted and contracted by the essence of man. There is a dissociation between the existent and his act of existence, even though, notwithstanding this dissociation, there is an intimate relation between the existent and his existence. Our existence is limited to being that of a man—not that of a rose nor of a tree nor of an angel. We do not exist in our own right, nor does any other existent which falls under our conscious and empirical knowledge.

The enigma of an existence shared by all existing beings but contracted and limited by their essence points a finger to one who exists in his own right for its solution. It is with this controlling insight that the author discusses the demonstrability of God's existence through natural evidence, and that he initiates his demonstration according to the five classical ways of the Angelic Doctor. His method of working out his argument is most commendable. Following the movement of intellectual discovery, he first presents the problem, and then, through objections, shows it to be a real problem. He appeals to evidence in the light of previously acquired knowledge, and it is only then that he brings forth his solution and formulates a thesis. We fully agree with the publisher's claim that "the classic proofs of the existence of God are more thoroughly covered here than in any other work in English."

The seven remaining chapters probe into the problem of God's nature and perfections, but merely in the perspective of natural evidence. In the appendices the author achieves something very seldom found in a manual, pre-

senting a broad and extensive view of agnosticism from Ockham to Kant and modern existentialists such as Heidegger and Sartre. Many readers will be surprised to find Maimonides among agnostics, but the author has in mind the possibility of knowing the essence of God, and not his existence. He does not seem to be aware of the excellent work being done by Toronto medievalists to free the doctrine of the Arabic commentators of Aristotle from the interpretations of their Latin translators in the Middle Ages.

An Introduction to Natural Theology is an excellent manual. It offers a definite answer to the confusion that prevails especially among existentialist agnostics and among Neo-Kantians, regarding that knowledge of God which is so vital to the sanity of our humanity.

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Religions: A Preliminary Historical and Theological Study. By D. W. Gundry. London, Toronto: Macmillan Company, 1958. Pp. xi, 189. $2.75.

The demands of living together in one world with peoples of other races and cultures have led to a deepening desire on the part of many thoughtful people to know more about the sources of cultures other than their own. The widespread current interest in the religions of mankind is evidenced by the amount of space devoted to such questions in a number of leading secular magazines. The resurgence of the non-Christian religions of the world has brought them forcibly into the area of our study and concern as vital factors in human progress. The current interest in the "theology of mission" in ecumenical Church circles indicates that the Christian Church is seeking to clarify theologically its approach to the non-Christian religions. All these circumstances make most timely the publication of a book on "comparative theology," as the author describes this preliminary historical and theological study of the religions of mankind. This work, by the Dean of the Faculty of Theology in University College of North Wales, is a useful, non-technical study intended to interest and inform a variety of readers—students, thoughtful laymen, teachers, and the clergy.

Beginning with a discussion of "What is religion?" and developing the theme "What is the beginning of religion historically and psychologically?" the author proceeds to a clear, concise statement of the main characteristics of the religions of mankind, with the purpose not only of describing them, which he does in a most illuminating manner, but also of assessing them, to give some indication of how far they assist man to know the truth. The body of the book is devoted to this survey of religions from the religious quest of the ancient world—Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Civilization, Greece, and Rome—and what the author calls the "undeveloped religions" of primitive peoples and of Shinto, through the monistic religions—Taoism,

Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism—to the monotheistic religions with their basic belief in "the Known God"—Hebrew religion, Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Christianity. The treatment of the two latter groups is helpful inasmuch as they are dealt with, not theoretically, but as "living" religions.

Especially useful is the chapter on the primitive religions, in which it is made clear that religion and culture do not always coincide. Culturally backward people can have a nobler religion than those who are culturally advanced. Still more important, and terrifying, is the fact that people in an advanced stage of culture and civilization can have a primitive and backward form of religion. What really determines the quality of religion is a people's degree of moral and spiritual vision. From this discussion the writer goes on to a consideration of magic and its relation to both religion and science. "Magic reflects an arrogant attitude towards the supernatural, religion a humble" (p. 68). Magic is a recurrent feature of religion, as is confirmed by some of the decadent practices of the higher religions, Christianity included—witness the increasing number of Christopher images on car dashboards. The book closes with the reminder that religion is basically a matter, not of speculation, but of decision, for religion is not a department of life, but undergirds the whole of life. There must be a commitment to a religion if it is to yield up its treasures.

Since the author writes from a distinctly Christian viewpoint, it would have been helpful if he had dealt with the theological factors involved in the Christian approach to the non-Christian religions—one of the most pressing problems facing the Church today if it is to meet the needs of mankind and be a "world Church" in fact. He deals, however, with two simple prerequisites—a knowledge of the living religions of the world and a sympathetic understanding of them—and his book makes a good start at both of these.

It is unfortunate that in a book so careful in matters of detail there should occur in at least two places the term "Chinaman", which has come to be regarded especially by English-speaking Chinese as opprobrious. The charts on the end papers, both front and back, add considerably to the usefulness of the book.

R. M. Ransom

Board of Overseas Missions
Presbyterian Church in Canada

Christendom: The Christian Churches, their Doctrines, Constitutional Forms and Ways of Worship. By E. Molland. London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. (Toronto: The Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. xiv, 418. $7.00.

This book is a valuable and important contribution to the comparative study of Church Faith, Order, and Worship. The author is the professor of ecclesiastical history in the University of Oslo and what we have now is the English version of a work that appeared first in Norwegian in 1953. While the book could be described as a one-volume encyclopedia, it is

something more. There is abundant information about the churches under review, and it is well arranged with a clear understanding and presentation of what is significant, but the author has gone beyond this. As he himself says, "a knowledge of the distinctive character of a particular Church involves not only the study of its doctrine, constitution and worship, but also of its ethos." Professor Molland has been highly successful in achieving this broader knowledge. He has passed beyond mere objectivity to penetrate with genuine spiritual appreciation into the distinctive emphases of the individual churches. Moreover, he has recognized that there are movements within churches which give rise to parties, or schools of thought and practice, creating what almost becomes churches within the churches. The writer has made his way through the wide territories of ecclesiastical history with great skill to give us a volume of unique value to every student of comparative symbolics, particularly at this time of ecumenical encounter.

The problem of arrangement and proportionate emphasis must have been a formidable one for Molland. With limitations which are serious enough to require later comment, he has contrived to cover the ground with a wise and far-seeing eye. Part One, which deals with "the churches of Christendom," extends to more than three-fourths of the entire work. In successive chapters, the author presents the various churches in a truly catholic survey, which begins with the Orthodox Church, moves on to the Roman Catholics, with a short intervening chapter on the smaller Oriental Churches, and ends with the Society of Friends. Here all the churches pass before the reader in a review which is not only comprehensive enough to include what may be called the "regular denominations" such as the Anglican, Lutheran, Reformed, Methodist, Moravian, Congregationalist, and Baptist churches, but also extends its range to deal with the Salvation Army, the Disciples, Plymouth Brethren, the Church of the New Jerusalem, the Adventists, and the Pentecostalists. It is quite a remarkable achievement not merely to provide valuable information, but actually to enter into the religious ethos of the various communions—all within a comparatively brief compass.

Part Two displays still further the wide range of Molland's interest. Here he deals with what he calls "Religious Systems containing elements derived from Christianity." In four successive chapters he gives us an account of Unitarianism, Christian Science, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Mormonism.

The author is not content to leave us with his informative survey. He draws his "Conclusions", in which he deals with the problems presented by the varieties of ecclesiastical Christianity. Wherein lies Christendom? What are its distinguishing marks? In a brief but penetrating survey he discusses what appears to be common to all the churches and also their differences. He proceeds to ask the question that torments the Christian mind and conscience: How, if at all, can they come together? This, he says, is a question for theology, but he is not content simply to present the terms of the problem. While he recognizes that in one sense the variety of the churches is a witness to the riches of the gospel, at the same time this does not "mitigate

the scandal of the disunity of Christendom." Even so, he adds a valuable appendix on the history of the modern ecumenical movement. Not the least valuable part of the book is the Bibliography, where the student will find abundant material to continue his studies in the field so admirably introduced by the author.

The most serious defect of the book is the scanty attention given to what is happening in the younger churches. The writer looks at his subject, for the most part, through European eyes. It is true that most of the churches in other parts of the world trace their origin to the older churches of Europe and bear the marks of their ancestry. Nevertheless, church polity has been considerably modified in the process of transplantation and new orders have arisen. There is little or no recognition of what has happened to the older churches here in North America. The Protestant Episcopal Church is not even mentioned in the chapter on Anglicanism. He ignores the profound effect of the Civil War on the ethos of American Presbyterianism and of the Baptists. While we have a whole chapter on the Church of South India, there is not a single word about the united churches of North India, Japan, China, and the Phillipines, and nothing is said about what is happening to the older church orders in Africa. Yet, it is from these very sources that the most urgent questions of church unity arise in our time. The United Church of Canada gets three and a half lines in the Appendix.

Despite these criticisms, we have no hesitation in saying that this is a unique work of reference and study for all who are interested in the important subject with which it deals.

James S. Thomson

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The Riddle of Roman Catholicism. By Jaroslav Pelikan. New York, Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. Pp. 272. $4.00.

This book is the winner of an Abingdon Award—a fact which speaks for its high quality. The author is a young Lutheran minister, who is professor of historical theology at the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago.

This book is unique in its positive approach to the question of Roman Catholicism, which many of us must admit seems a "riddle." It is a book in which, while the major differences between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism are explored, a serious quest for common ground is undertaken, in order that we may both come to understand each other better. The discovery of ways and means of furthering unity, if not union, between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism would seem to be the chief aim of the writer.

The book consists of three parts, following an introduction. These parts, which are divided into sixteen chapters, deal respectively with "The Evolution of Roman Catholicism," "The Genius of Roman Catholicism," and "A Theological Approach to Roman Catholicism."

The basic "text" of the book is what the author describes at the beginning as an "oversimplified formula," namely, that the Church must maintain "identity plus universality. By 'identity' I mean that which distinguishes the church from the world—its message, its uniqueness, its particularity. By 'universality,' on the other hand, I mean that which impels the church to embrace nothing less than all mankind in its vision and in its appeal" (p. 22). Throughout the book the reader is made aware of the fact that the author does not lose sight of these two foci of church life; sometimes the church loses its identity in trying to maintain its universality, or vice versa; or as at the Reformation, both sides of the controversy lost something of the perspective of both identity and universality.

The author writes of "The Tragic Necessity" of the Reformation. While neither side desired the results which eventually ensued, the Decrees and Canons of the Council of Trent (1545–63) caused both groups to harden in their opposition to each other. Roman reaction to the Protestant emphasis on reformation according to the Word of God was that Rome elevated

> to official status the notion of justification by faith plus works, which was only one of the doctrines of justification in the medieval theologians and ancient fathers. . . .—What had previously been permitted (justification by faith and works), now became required. What had previously been permitted also (justification by faith alone), now became forbidden. In condemning the Protestant Reformation, the Council of Trent condemned part of its own catholic tradition [p. 52].

This is only one example of the extreme positions taken at the Reformation and afterwards by both Romanists and Protestants.

The author takes it for granted that Roman Catholicism is "here to stay" (p. 175). What approach can Protestants and Romanists, then, make to each other? Can Protestantism become more sacramental? Can Catholicism give greater emphasis to the preaching of the Word? The author refers to the authorized promise of Karl Adam, the Romanist theologian, "that if Protestants returned to Rome, they would be granted a vernacular liturgy, a married clergy, and the chalice in the Lord's Supper" (p. 238). This will be news to many Protestants. But does it go far enough? Certainly the author's emphasis on the need for more study and conversation together between both groups is well taken. Moreover, as Dr. Pelikan says, "the way of conversion" for either side in the controversy is "a blind alley" and must be avoided (p. 211).

This work of major significance cannot even be "skimmed" in a short review. However, there are a couple of observations that should be made. Is not adherence to the Papacy, as the Romanists understand it, one of the chief stumbling-blocks to any *rapprochement* between Romanists and Protestants? But very little is said about this matter in this book. Moreover, are there not divergencies in theology so wide and deep that, at least from our present position, they seem unbridgeable? If the development of Mariology is a new "nature religion," as our author mentions (p. 139), does not this widen the breach between these two branches of Western Christendom?

Or again, Romanism is based theologically on Thomism. A cardinal thesis of Thomism is that "grace does not abolish nature, but sustains and perfects it" (p. 147). To Protestants this is a form of naturalism or Pelagianism. If Thomism is true at this point was there any vital need for the Incarnation and Atonement accomplished by Christ? Protestants believe that grace has to redeem nature and recreate it, which is something very different from "sustaining and perfecting" it. There are basic theological questions of this sort which do not receive adequate treatment in this book. Perhaps, however, to ask for more would be to expect too much in one volume, even as considerable a book as this.

No one interested in the ecumenical church can afford to miss reading Pelikan's book. It makes one think seriously about the major division in Western Christendom, and it offers some suggestions as to how a start can be made to overcome this division—e.g., through the promotion of common Bible study, theological discussion, etc.

What is needed is "apostolic variety within apostolic unity." Can the Church of the future hold to these two emphases and at the same time maintain both identity and universality? We are certain that the author's words will strike a responsive chord in many minds:

> We have, and yet we seek, a church that is one, holy, catholic, and apostolic. For deep within, when the battle cries are stilled, all of us know that the church we now have is less than the church we want, and that the church we want will be, in ways that are known only to God, the fulfillment of the church we have. Thus, when we measure the unity we have, we also begin to discern the dimensions of the unity we seek [p. 189].

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The New Shape of American Religion. By Martin E. Marty. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. Pp. x, 180. $3.50.

The alleged revival of religion in the United States since the end of the Second World War has been subjected to many examinations during recent years. These have ranged from popular articles in the press usually unduly favourable in tone, to the more serious efforts found in such books as Eckardt's *The Surge of Piety in America* and Osborn's *The Spirit of American Chistianity.* By far the best examination of this revival that has come to this reader's attention is that found in Martin Marty's book, *The New Shape of American Religion.* Anyone who has read his fresh and illuminating study, *A Short History of Christianity*, will come to this new work with high expectations, nor will he be disappointed.

The aim of this book is not simply to survey and evaluate the present religious situation in America, but to use such an examination as the ground for "a call to a culture ethic." In this hour of cultural crisis the Christian Church in every area of its life must forge an ethic which has a

creative and redeeming relevance to contemporary culture. The author does not attempt to elaborate such an ethic, but is concerned rather to show how urgent is the need.

In outline the book consists of the following four major divisions: (1) An analysis of the present religious and cultural situation in the United States against the background of history and contemporary sociological conditions; (2) An examination of the theological resources which are available to the Church; (3) An exposition of the strategic position of the parish church in relation to the present religious task; (4) A simple call for a "culture ethic."

The analysis of the present religious situation in the first section of the book is both provocative and penetrating. As Marty sees the history of American Protestantism, it is a continuous process of erosion by which the particularity of Christian faith has increasingly become blurred. The multiplicity of faiths in the American community, the mass media of communication, the emergence of the organization man, and the rise and spread of suburbia have all conspired to smooth down and round off the sharp edges and corners of the historical faith in God reconciling the world unto himself in Christ Jesus. God has become the genial collaborator with man to whom everyone, from athlete to movie actress, waves a friendly hand, and to disbelieve in him is to be un-American. This packaged God makes no demand and renders no judgment and, when faith in him is analyzed, it proves to be little more than faith in faith. Religion-in-general has become the characteristic expression of the religious life of America and it has become equated with the American Way of Life. Such is the new shape of religion in post-Protestant America.

Since the section summarized above constitutes the largest portion of Dr. Marty's book, his emphasis is therefore analytical, and this reader has the impression that the author is happiest with it. Certainly it has the liveliest chapters. The proportionately large analytical element is only fully justifiable, however, if this work is preliminary to a constructive elaboration of the culture ethic as the author seems to intend it to be.

If analysis provides the liveliest portion, the short chapter on theological resources is the most effective. In a succinct summary of the major discussions of the theological renascence of recent years, Dr. Marty singles out the areas of the doctrines of man, God, and the Church as the ones most relevant to the present religious task. He finds a source of hope and strength in the biblical portrait of man which sees his "emergence within the community of individuals with personal value and personal responsibility." The God of the Bible confronts man in Jesus Christ in the form of a servant who shows that the death of self is the way to true selfhood. Finally the Remnant motif of the Bible is used to portray the Church with integrity of membership. The author would confront the Organization Man, the packaged God of religion-in-general, and the Church which has lost its sense of difference from the world, with this biblical man, God, and Church.

The third section of the book examines the strength and weakness of the parish as the strategic point to begin the religious task of achieving a culture ethic. It is written with the insight of one who knows the parish from within but has the detachment of the true historian. It is here in the congregation that the cultivation of the Remnant can best take place in worship, teaching, discipline, and vocational awareness.

The final chapter on "The Call for a Culture Ethic" is simply that, and points forward to its achievement after recapitulating the argument of the book.

This work is modest in size and in intent but it does make an important contribution to the present cultural and religious debate. The author uses historical, theological, and sociological insights effectively to illuminate the issues of contemporary America. While the book is pointed directly at the the United States, much of its analysis and many of its conclusions are applicable to the Canadian scene.

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God's People in India. By J. W. Grant. Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1959. Pp. xiv, 112. $3.00.

On the one hand, Dr. Grant prepared for his visit to India with background reading and study. On the other hand, he spent less than a year in India, studying and travelling. Yet the result is the most definitive study of the historic relation between the Christian mission and the Christian Church in India which this reviewer has been privileged to read and to recommend for study both of missionary method and of sound lines of Church development.

Not only is the format of the book attractive and the material presented in an easy literary style, but the treatment is objective—not just coldly objective, but showing a fine balance of sympathy and frankness, of appreciation and criticism. More than this, there is careful evaluation, wise counsel, and sound advice in good measure.

Beginning with the strangeness of missions in the Hindu context of India, Dr. Grant deals with the Indian response to Christ, such as it has been—more to Christ as an isolated figure than to his Church, we must admit, even though an Indian Christian community has come into being. The trouble is that this community is small, weak, in danger of becoming encysted for its own protection, thereby tending to become just one more religious community among many. While the national movement has made the Indian Church self-conscious, this new self-consciousness has not resulted in a keen sense of mission to the nation.

At this point Dr. Grant introduces a survey of the ways in which the

Christian Gospel has been presented to India—by Wm. Carey through evangelism, education in the vernacular, and translation work; by Alexander Duff through education in English; by means of mass movements, rural centres, industrial institutes, etc. More indigenous methods include the Christian *ashram*, in which Christians and non-Christians live and study together, and the *bhajan*, in which the Gospel story is recited or sung or both to attentive and appreciative audiences. Both of these methods, at their best, lead to baptism and incorporation into God's People in India.

The question of indigenization is dealt with under the categories of worship and of an Indian theology. The author rightly urges indigenization but not Hinduization, adaptation but the maintenance of Christian integrity, a certain nationalism of expression but an element of universalism also—what God has done through his Messiah and what he wills to do through his Spirit for the redemption of the Indian individual *and* Indian society.

The chapter on "Western Mission and Indian Church" is particularly important for the missionary constituency at the home base, wherever that may be. It *is* hard for the layman to realize the rapidity and extent of change in the missionary enterprise in recent years. With a remarkable grasp of the numerous facets of Indian life and of missionary traditions strongly influenced by British rule, Dr. Grant examines and evaluates the changing relations between mission and Church in a challenging yet persuasive way.

In two chapters on the "New India" and the "Church of Tomorrow," Dr. Grant brings his incisive study to a conclusion, with his usual insight and clear exposition. This is a book to be read and pondered by all who have the true welfare of India at heart.

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Glauben und Verstehen: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Dritter Band. By Rudolf Bultmann. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1960. Pp. 212. DM 15.–.

This third volume of Bultmann's collected essays contains fifteen from the years 1952 to 1958, but it starts with an important discussion of "The Concept of Revelation in the New Testament" that first appeared as long ago as 1929. Doubtless this has been done, not only to rescue an article from the distant past and an out-of-the-way location, but primarily to exhibit the continuity of the Bultmann of demythologizing with Bultmann the form-critic and dialectical theologian. The other essays in this volume, with a few exceptions, deal with the author's ideas of divine encounter, faith, and preaching; or, what is much the same thing, with the biblical attitude to man and his world as interpreted by Bultmann. One paper discusses the question whether it is possible to have an exegesis without presuppositions,

while another, originally published in *The Christian Century* in August, 1958, presents some thoughts on the present theological situation. (Five of the essays have appeared in English or American journals, one of them in the first volume of this journal.) Two deal specifically with the problem of demythologizing.

Thus far it may have seemed that this volume is too erudite for the preacher and the average reader, and if so we must hasten to correct any such impression. Here we find the Marburg teacher writing about genuine Christian preaching as distinguished from "secularized" preaching, on the strangeness of the faith, and about the meaning of Christmas. He relates true humanism to Christianity, considers what word may be said to the situation of men in the atomic age, and what must be said about Germany and Israel. True, he provides no comfortable homiletics, because he holds that there is no such thing as a Christian culture or Christian training (*paideia*) or Christian education or Christian art, since only the decision of each moment of our human existence can truly be called Christian (p. 72). Again, the task of the Church is to proclaim the Gospel and not to make political judgments; all it can do is to help believers to be responsible men, reminding them all the time that there is no security in this pilgrim life, only freedom to walk in courage.

This idea of a "pulsation" of existential moments in which one must decide for God's Word in Christ is typical of the dialectical or crisis theology, and it seems to liken faith to the piston of an automobile engine, that could choose to reject the gas mixture and thus come to a dead end. It is as if friendship could never persist, but must ever be entered on afresh in one encounter after another. This is just not true of human affection; why should it be true of Christian love and service of God? Catholic Christianity rightly retorts that we are baptized into Christ and sustained by God's Spirit, that we may grow in grace, that there is a new life which we share. Of course, we may fall from grace; but surely Paul and other New Testament writers have a doctrine of assurance that is based on a decisive faith in Christ as the place of reconciliation. We have been justified, we have been baptized (as Luther would say).

Other characteristic ideas are the following:

Revelation is something supernatural, coming from outside but not irrational. Because it is the event that destroys death and the fear of death, it is the gift of life. Man can be addressed by God, who created him. Man has forgotten this in the primal sin of self-assertion. God speaks to man in Jesus Christ, the Lord of the *kerygma*, so that revelation consists simply in the fact of Jesus Christ. But there must be a moment of decision in which I hear the Word (through priest or prophet) and return to God. Only in this moment of existential decision does a man truly have his being. He is the *historical* animal.

Man is, of course, utterly dependent on a God who is for ever his

"boundary," his beginning and his end, his creator and his saviour. God is primarily Will, and he is active in the "world," that is to say, in "history" (*Geschichte*). History must look to an End that is the goal of the divine history, and so the Christian faith (like Israel's) is at once "eschatological" and homiletical. History is the sphere of decision. The man of faith is a responsible man, who lives "out of the future." Man must be open to God as the God who comes; the Bible knows God only as him who comes in history.

This message was given first in the mythology of the Bible, and it must now be interpreted for modern intellectuals who are trained in the scientific world-view. If Christmas, with its angels and wise men, its star and its shepherds, really proclaims the Word made flesh in Jesus Christ, then we must preach this today as the offer of freedom from oneself to be a new man. Only God can give this freedom; it is all of grace. Paul's doctrine is basically the same, says Bultmann.

Again, the primitive Church looked for the eschatological crisis in the immediate future, and described it in mythological fashion (the clouds, the trumpet, and the angels). This can now be seen to have been an error. The myths must be so interpreted that their message is retained, but what of the time when the End will come? Will the Second Coming be soon? (Many of us know how frequently such questions are put to us.) Bultmann has no interest in this expectation, but rather looks to the demythologized view taken (so he thinks) by the fourth evangelist. He is concerned to note what happened when this adventist hope was disappointed, and consequently he traces the development of the Church idea, its piety, its organization, its accommodation to the philosophy of the outside world, and so on. On pp. 43–47 he considers what happened to the primitive doctrine of the Spirit.

Is it necessary to say that Bultmann's work is significant and provocative? He has an evangelistic purpose, he is preacher as well as professor, and above all a Christian rather than an existentialist philosopher. He has raised important questions, as most scholars would recognize. But his analysis is defective at a vital spot. The historical (*i.e., historisch*, in the sense of what in fact took place) is linked to the historic (*i.e., geschichtlich*, in the sense of the event plus a value-judgment) in no accidental way. Hence, Jesus, the historical Jesus, is at the same time the historic Jesus Christ, the Word of God; and what God has joined together, let not Bultmann put asunder! If we could prove that Jesus is a myth, we should have to abandon Christianity or cherish it deliberately as an illusion that keeps us going in a mad world. So the Jesus of history must be sought and loved, and loved as God made man for us.

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Cambridge Greek Testament: The Gospel according to St. Mark. By C. E. B. Cranfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada), 1959. Pp. xvi, 480. $6.75.

This is the second volume in the new Cambridge series, and it is wholly worthy of the great tradition established in the two older series. In his preface the general editor, C. F. D. Moule, states that, in contrast to those earlier series, explicitly aimed at schools and colleges, "it seems better not to use titles suggesting any definition of the readers." The reviewer devoutly wishes that there were a school or college constituency in whose hands the present volume could be placed. (True, there is a small public of this sort in Great Britain still, though from all reports it is rapidly diminishing.) How stimulating and illuminating an introduction to the serious study of the Gospels this commentary would be to a qualified older teen-ager! Its conciseness and clarity in its short prefatory essays would surely grip him and awaken a respect for the validity and depth of St. Mark's Gospel both as record and as revelation, in a manner commensurate with his intellectual and spiritual needs.

This remark is not meant to suggest that the commentary is elementary. Rather, the special competence of the volume makes it a matter of regret that these pages will hardly ever claim the attention of anyone younger than (or other than) a second-year divinity student. In other words, the perusal of this commentary has caused the reviewer, perhaps irrelevantly, to cry over the spilt milk of our educational opportunities.

However, for the aforesaid divinity students this volume is everything it should be for introductory study; and it is truly introductory in that it constantly alludes to other approaches and points to further areas over a considerable range of critical history. At the same time, Dr. Cranfield leaves no doubt of his own position and conclusions. These are what would nowadays be called "conservative"—misleadingly enough, because so often resulting from a more thorough criticism than many "liberals" pursue. Thus, Mark's authorship and Petrine tradition are affirmed without ignoring form-critical indications that the Gospel is probably multiple. In a five-page section on historical reliability, the author deftly communicates the essence of form criticism and of Bultmann's demythologizing in a way which cannot but inform and stimulate the student. The careful treatment accorded outstanding contributors to the Gospel's study both in the introductory matter and in the notes is complemented by the best bibliography so far published. J. N. Sanders has contributed a chapter on textual criticism, which matches the rest of the volume in terseness and clarity.

The main body of the book is well arranged and the notes on the Greek text are remarkably complete both linguistically and exegetically. Notable attention is given, among other precursors, to Vincent Taylor, whose personal encouragement the author acknowledges. A good example of Cranfield's balanced consideration of critical opinion is found in the discussion of "Son of Man" in connection with the first Passion prediction at Mark 8:31. The author devotes six pages to the problem of this title and

includes a special bibliography. The title, he thinks, is an authentic self-designation of our Lord, and is representative, not corporate, in connotation. Its suitability is seen in relation to the messianic hiddenness, though not in Wrede's sense of that conception (p. 78). The title "without much forcing could be made to carry the idea of suffering, for already in Enoch the figure of the Son of Man and the Servant of the Lord had been fused, and so, even if the sufferings were not one of the features taken over in Enoch, the way was prepared for the idea of a suffering Son of Man" (p. 275). Further it is noted that possibly "that idea was actually present in Dan. 7:21." Also the author adduces the opinion of Zimmerli and Jeremias in their study of *The Servant of God* that the idea of a suffering Messiah was not absent from Judaism, and thinks "its rareness is probably the result of anti-Christian polemic" (p. 277). The one thing not said in an excellent survey, and which nonetheless seems to be demanded by the evidence, is that Jesus, if not original, was a lonely and uniquely perceptive interpreter of messianism in his own generation.

In his treatment of the "little apocalypse" in Mark 13 Dr. Cranfield offers a helpful discussion of recent thought, at least in so far as it bears on the document's authenticity. His "tentative conclusion" is that the chapter "does give us substantially our Lord's teaching" and that, though there is evidence that it is composite, it is not to be dismissed, as is frequently done, as an unintelligent mixture misrepresenting the mind of Jesus (p. 390). He maintains, rightly, that while apocalyptic language is employed we have not here a typically Jewish apocalypse. But when he turns to exegesis, the author may not be thought entirely happy in his solution; and certainly he neglects certain clues. Of course the impossible should not be expected from the treatment of so vexed a problem in so short a space. To discuss the case for realized eschatology would be a lengthy business; and in any case Dr. Cranfield shows earlier that he is not enamoured of the theory in his treatment of the difficult passage at Mark 9:1. With or without this resource, his exegesis takes no account of the possibility that there is more than one kind of eschatological event referred to in the apocalypse. We are left with the view that "in the crises of history the eschatological is foreshadowed" (p. 404). This would seem to be a thoroughly un-Jewish and sophisticated philosophy of history to attribute to Jesus.

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Paul and the Salvation of Mankind. By Johannes Munck. London: SCM Press (Toronto: Ryerson Press), 1959. Pp. 351. $8.50.

This is the translation into English, by Frank Clarke, of a work originally published in German, in 1954, by a Danish New Testament scholar of the first rank. It contains a series of learned essays, addressed to specialists rather than to the general reader, in which we are offered a general theory of the

mission of St. Paul and of his relations with the leaders of the Jerusalem church which differs widely from the prevailing views of the day. Munck feels that New Testament scholarship is still led astray by the historical theories of F. C. Baur and the Tübingen school, even though the literary theories on which they rested have been generally abandoned. He feels especially that the hostility manifested towards Paul in certain Jewish-Christian writings of the late second century has been unjustifiably read back into apostolic times and so has been allowed to colour, and even to distort, our picture of the attitude of the Jewish-Christian churches of Jerusalem and Judaea and their leaders. As a result, Paul's affirmation of the general approval given to his work by the "pillars" of the Jerusalem church has been unduly discounted, and the evidence of Acts has been dismissed as tendentious, on the basis of evidence drawn from much later documents which are not regarded as trustworthy in other respects. Munck argues, accordingly, that there was no such far-reaching conflict between Paul and the Jerusalem leaders as is commonly assumed. He and they are alike in holding that the Gospel is for all mankind, but must be taken "to the Jew *first*, and also to the Greek"; and the only point of difference lies in the timing. They do not try to impose circumcision and the Law of Moses on the Gentiles, any more than he; this is the policy of a sectarian group which they disown.

This interpretation is supported by a fresh approach to the four main epistles—Galatians, I and II Corinthians, and Romans—especially in the matter of the nature of the opponents whom Paul is attacking in each case. Some of the resultant exegesis will prove startling to most readers. The party of the circumcision in Galatians is not made up of Jewish-Christians, or even of Jews, but of Gentile-Christians who have somehow taken into their heads that circumcision is necessary for salvation, and have alleged that Paul has received his gospel at second-hand and stands on a lower level than the pillars of the Jerusalem church. (This theory seems to give too little weight to the explicit statement of Paul in Galatians that it was emissaries from Jerusalem, from James, who caused the separation of Jews from Gentiles at Antioch and were influential enough to carry even Peter and Barnabas over to their side.) Further, Munck claims, "schisms" (*schismata*) of I Cor. 1 are not properly conceived as "factions" in the church, but mere bickerings; and it is a mistake to think of an "Apollos-party," a "Peter-party," and a "Paul-party." (Here again we must ask whether this gives sufficient weight to the indications that Paul thinks of these people as giving a kind of allegiance to the apostolic leaders which ought to be given only to Christ.) These bickerings have no connection with the trouble-makers who are assailed in II Cor. And the enemies envisaged in Philippians 3 are not Jewish-Christians, but Jews.

It is impossible in a review to give any adequate idea of the richness and variety of this book, and the remarks made above must not be taken as implying any lack of weight in the argument. This is a book of the first

importance. It is based upon wide and solid learning, and must be taken into account by all future work on the history of the apostolic age and on the interpretation of the Pauline epistles. There is a great deal of penetrating and thought-provoking exegesis, not only of the four epistles to which the greatest attention is given, but also to Acts and to the Synoptic Gospels—the latter as sources for the traditions of the Palestinian churches, that is, for the whole conception of the gospel as held in Jewish-Christian circles. Professor Munck compels us to take a fresh look at the whole question of Paul and the Primitive Church, and it may well be that the general verdict will go in his favour—that scholarship has in fact been too much under the unconcious sway of the Tübingen theories. But it must be emphasized that this not a book for casual or even for devotional reading, but for close scholarly study.

It should be said that the work of translation has been done admirably—unlike many recent translations of important theological works.

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The Religious Orders in England, Vol. III. By David Knowles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959. Pp. 521. $10.75.

Medieval English monasticism collapsed in the 1530's and vanished. For many decades it had been in decline but its buildings and wealth, the numbers of its professed, and the prominence of its leaders gave it a continuing appearance of strength and permanence. Protestant historians have been ready to see it as a social and religious anachronism ready for destruction. Catholic historians have been tempted to explain away its demise. Dom Knowles, writing with the sympathies of a Catholic scholar, examines all the available evidence to discover just what went wrong in the Church and in England.

He begins with some brief comments on the cultural state of England: the decline of the universities and learning in an England only slightly touched by the Renaissance; the development of music; the non-participation of monasteries in this and other arts. He holds Erasmus mainly accountable for the critical disposition of the policy-making classes toward the monasteries. He writes of him that while he never denied any pre-Tridentine formula of doctrine, his attitude to revealed truth differed significantly from that of one who followed "by instinct or desire the 'mind of the Church'. . . . He remained as it were agnostic to the thesis that a religious truth could be contained within a theological formula or a virtuous life regulated by a disciplinary code." Knowles does not approve of Erasmus. He blames also a latent religious radicalism, persistent in England, that was opposed to religious institutions and hierarchy. To these he adds the secular spirit of the

age, materialistic and grasping, bent on manipulating law without regard to justice or moral accountability.

The various religious orders are considered one by one in respect of organization, activities, and control, and the conclusion is reached that supervision by superiors was not thorough. Visitations were held, but not with any intent of reform. It sufficed if public scandal was avoided. Accused could clear themselves by oaths of five members of the house. It was common to find that men or women who had been convicted were later given promotion. Dr. Knowles examines a large number of individual cases. Numbers of these men were worthy, but for others no such claim could be made. In general there was a weak sense of vocation.

Chapters on reform and suppression recount the measures of Wolsey by which he got the authority and initiative from the papacy and proceeded to bully monks and suppress or transform houses. He showed Henry and Cromwell what could be done. It is indicated that Henry was not certain at first what to do about the monasteries, but that Cromwell's plans took form early. The commissions that he sent out are followed by the author, and their methods and characters assessed. Knowles agrees with the commonly held view that spoliation was the objective and calumniation the approach to it. The moral inventory was an adjunct to the economic inventory.

The first step on the way was to dispose of those stricter orders that resisted the King's "divorce" and his supremacy in the Church. They were dangerous as possible rallying centres. The most notable communities were the Carthusians and the Observants, in both of which there were upstanding individuals who would not yield and were therefore put away. This done, King and Vicar-General had their way.

> Those that were left were called upon to follow a most exacting rule without the confidence that comes from submission to those with canonical and personal claims to obedience, and they were exposed to all the assaults upon the citadel of the soul that are delivered by the waves of doubt and despondency that swell and eddy in times of stress within the walls of an enclosed community. . . . We catch glimpses of an ineffectual piety that wished, but dared not, to make a stand, and which was thwarted by the treachery of a discontented element which was so common and so lamentable a feature of Tudor monastic life.

Dom Knowles does not agree that dissolution led to economic distress. He examines the numbers of employees, classifies them, and concludes that the majority would find employment with the successors of the monasteries. The amount of charity had been locally appreciable but in the absence of any over-all directing agency was not a major matter. The gradualness of the transfer of monastic lands by leases to new owners prevented collapse of land values.

The author criticizes the monasteries at particular points. Heads of houses had an unjustifiably large share of the income and were extravagant in their personal establishments. Inmates demanded wages and holidays and table indulgences that had nothing to do with the original character of their

profession. There was a lack of conviction; the monasteries had conformed too fully to the world. There was no sacramental devotion. Heads of houses had become too involved in affairs outside their order. It is a state of general worldliness rather than a prevalence of vice that explains the fall. Knowles is shocked by the readiness of the abbots and priors to compound with those who despoiled their houses, accepting liberal pensions or preferment in the successor establishments.

This book offers the best analysis yet of the dissolution from the ecclesiastical point of view. A wide and detailed range of evidence is examined, its possible meanings are considered, and possibilities distasteful to a Catholic thinker are faced. As the author considers the evidence phase by phase he accepts its probable meaning. Yet as he moves away from the details he tends to overlook the adverse conclusion he drew. At one point in the Epilogue (p. 461) a reviewer may be permitted to question the statement about endowment and members having come to the monastic orders unasked. One can certainly agree with the author's observation that institutions find it hard to learn that in the long run quality fluctuates in inverse ratio to quantity. One can wish, at the same time, that he had dealt with the monasteries' appropriation of parish churches, the cause of much of their unpopularity.

Dom Knowles writes with sympathy and imagination, making himself a companion of those who before they went out through the monastery portals turned for a last look at what had been their home. It is impossible for the humane historian to study the dissolution without a sense of tragedy. Nor can one contemplate the spirit in which it was accomplished without seeing a warning of what autocracy and secularism can combine to do.

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Church and State in Canada West: Three Studies in the relation of denominationalism and nationalism, 1841–1867. By John S. Moir. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959. Pp. xv, 232. $4.75.

To those versed in the tremendous contests of the medieval popes and emperors or even the perhaps more sordid self-assertion of a Philip IV or a Henry VIII, the clash of church and state in Canada West may seem something of a tempest in a teapot. There is, however, no doubt that the waves were, at times, so boisterous that they came near to shattering the teapot.

Canada West during the period 1841–1867 was associated with Canada East in a fresh experiment in parliamentary government, an experiment which proved the practicability of a colonial cabinet system and set United Canada on the road which was to lead to its expansion into the Dominion of Canada. There was, happily, no church-state problem in Canada East where the rights of the Protestant minority were secured along with the

clerical control of the majority. Canada West, however, had inherited in its infancy a kind of presumption that it would recognize the state church of the mother country, a presumption supported by the ambiguous and, in practice, vexatious provision of the Clergy Reserves, and vehemently promoted by that vigorous and competent promoter, Bishop Strachan. But, as Dr. Moir shows, the cultural climate of North America and, to be more specific, the facts of immigration, were not favourable to an established Church of England. American Episcopal Methodists, Baptists, and Congregationalists were moving into the Niagara Peninsula from the United States. Wesleyans were coming out from England, the Church of Scotland was there to claim equally the benefits of "establishment," and (after 1844) the Free Church constituted another energetic dissident group. Some of these groups wanted a complete separation of church and state, while others wanted only a good share of loaves and fishes, but all agreed in opposing an Anglican establishment. The situation was further complicated by the influx of Irish Roman Catholics in the late forties and early fifties and by the reproduction, with a vehemence encouraged by the smallness of the stage, of old world ultramontanism and anti-papalism.

The struggles which ensued cut across the already ill-defined party lines, added to the fury and confusion of politics in Canada West, and, hitherto scarcely explored by any historian, have bewildered and frustrated every student of the period. Dr. Moir treats separately the three aspects of the struggle: the disposal of the Clergy Reserves, the endowment and chartering of a provincial university, and the establishment of a system of elementary schools. The Clergy Reserves question, essentially a wrangle over property, was the easiest to settle in principle. The character of the provincially endowed university and of the elementary schools was another matter; it involved the perennial question of the association of religious with secular instruction in state-endowed schools. Dr. Moir sees all three questions as different aspects of the operation of "two antithetical tendencies . . . centrifugal denominationalism . . . [and] centripetal nationalism" (xiii). He has painstakingly accumulated a wealth of material which he presents in topical form on the Reserves, on the university question, and on the common schools. The unifying factor he finds in a sense of nationalism struggling to assert itself against the traditional claims to privilege of certain denominational groups.

A work of this kind was badly needed. Dr. Moir follows in careful detail the many ramifications of his three problems. He is an undisguised "nationalist," which is nothing new in Canadian historiography, but he treats Bishop Strachan with only moderate severity, reserving his sternest strictures for the less well-known Bishop de Charbonnel, Ryerson's chief adversary over the separate school question. Ryerson, as usual, gets very good marks, and the evidence presented here confirms earlier impressions of his vigour, ability, and fair-mindedness.

It is unfortunate that this useful and much needed work is not more

readable. Undoubtedly the author was confronted with a mountain of confusing, even baffling material. The exigent reader demands, however, and perhaps has a right to demand, that the confusion and bafflement should not be passed on to him. Narrative and analysis alike require a firm clear structure which is wanting here. A greater precision in syntax and in the use of words is also needed. "*Cause célèbre*," for example, does not mean "effective cause" (p. 17). The book would also have benefited from more careful proof-reading. Greater clarity and precision would not only have done much to attract the general reader, but would have given aid and comfort to the many scholars who must use this imporatant book as a work of reference. It should be added that five tables and charts notable for their clarity and for their interest are given as appendices.

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Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence. By H. DIEM. Tr. by H. KNIGHT. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited), 1959. Pp. viii, 218. $4.75.

PROFESSOR Diem won an award from the Kierkegaard Society of Copenhagen for this dissertation, which first appeared in German in 1950. The book makes extensive use of material from an earlier volume, published in 1929, and for this reason covers areas which have since been discussed by many writers. It is of limited value as an introduction to Kierkegaard, and the reader will sometimes find himself quite lost unless he has some familiarity with the various writing under discussion. To the knowledgeable reader, however, the book is indeed worthwhile.

Although the subject-matter of dialectic is his main theme, we find Diem working into many basic Kierkegaardian categories, such as paradox, incognito, and witness, all of which of course are integral to the existential dialectic. There is a short but worthwhile treatment of Kierkegaard's views on Church and State, an analysis of his famous "Attack," and a most interesting study of Kierkegaard's relation to Luther.

Professor Diem is convinced that many aspects of existentialist thought today are quite un-Kierkegaardian and that the various misunderstandings of Kierkegaard's thought are due to a failure to grapple with his dialectic. Diem, therefore, undertakes a careful examination of Kierkegaard's dialectic, in order that the true Kierkegaard may be better known and that developments in theology and philosophy since his time may be better appreciated. The modern use of the term "existential thinking" has been much too general, and clarification is needed. To this end Diem asks three questions: (*i*) What, for Kierkegaard, is the dialectic by which the thinker proves his own existence?; (*ii*) What is the dialectic of communication of truth?; (*iii*) How are (*i*) and (*ii*) related to each other?

Kierkegaard does not simply take over either the Socratic or the Platonic

method of dialectic for at least two main reasons: first, because this approach would fail to reckon with major subsequent philosophical developments, and secondly, because the Incarnation of God in Christ is an event of utmost importance in connection with the three questions raised above.

The presupposition underlying ancient and medieval philosophy, namely, that thought corresponds to reality, was rendered so questionable by the Kantian critique of reason that Hegel could not disregard the latter. Hegel tried, however, to overcome this critique, endeavouring by the aid of the concept of "pure thought" to ascribe a self-conscious reality to thought instead of a reality that was uncritically assumed. In all Kierkegaard's criticisms of this "pure thought" the one supreme question arises, whether the Hegelian reality is not a mere reality of ideas. Hegel, in Kierkegaard's judgment, interchanges the real with the reality of ideas.

Kierkegaard's dialectic finds its starting-point, not in reality in general, as with Hegel, but in the individual reality of the thinker himself. Here thought is only one factor among others, such as feeling, will, and imagination, and it must not be isolated from them. Hegel's dialectic got under way by the introduction of movement into logic. To Kierkegaard this was absurd because movement is something transcendent which can have no place in a logical system. The problem of movement must be approached and treated only in concrete terms of the thinker existing in the moment of choice.

The section on "The Dialectician's Irony and Humour" takes these rather unfamiliar aspects of Kierkegaard's writings and indicates their place in communication. Thus Diem writes: "The ironical personality may not allow his own inner values to be directly recognized in order to persuade men of some truth, but he must use all his talents in order to prevent any direct relationship with himself and to arouse the other to exist as an individual" (p. 45). Humour is a valuable asset in helping one to remain incognito in his relation with others in order to prevent them from fostering any religious relation to what is external, and it is also a necessity within the truly religious personality. A humorous attitude towards one's own thoughts and ideas protects the religious passion within.

All existential communication must take the form of possibility. "The reality of the experience proper to the one can only furnish the possibility of existence for another" (p. 42). Diem analyses the function of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings in relation to the dialectic of communication. In these writings Kierkegaard spoke without authority, and wished only to draw attention to the fact of Christianity. This indirect approach is the exact opposite of classical apologetics. In a sense it is a kind of cheating or deceit. It means that you do not begin directly with what you propose to impart, but rather with the assumption that the ideas of your interlocutor are the genuine goods. Diem inquires why Kierkegaard gives up any attempt to prove the truth of revelation and of the dogmatic affirmations which flow from it. Kierkegaard unfolds this truth dialectically, i.e., in such a way as to discuss the pros and cons of it, and then to leave the reader to decide for

himself. Not only does Kierkegaard claim no authority, but he also renounces any attempt to vouch for the truth of revelation on personal or institutional grounds. In this context, Diem analyses the various ways and means by which, according to Kierkegaard, revelation has been supported and "secured" in Christian history, namely, the Bible, the ordination of the preacher, the fact of the Church, and the sacrament of Baptism, and outlines Kierkegaard's criticism.

The book has four short but worthwhile "Appendixes", in which Kierkegaard is discussed in the light of recent essays, notably one (by Krüger) which touches upon the connection between Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Heidegger.

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The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. By GORDON HARLAND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Pp. xvii, 298. $6.00.

FEW who know the field would risk the denial that Reinhold Niebuhr is high in the front rank of contemporary religious thinkers, a mighty force and figure in philosophy of history and philosophical theology. The significance and prominence of his work make it necessary for any who pretend to understanding in these areas to have acquaintance with it.

But Niebuhr's books and other writings—not to mention the books that have appeared about Niebuhr—are so numerous and voluminous that many who have the will may lack the time needed to gain this acquaintance. Such readers as these will have real help from the present volume, with its compact statement, in less than three hundred pages, of the body of Niebuhr's thought, both in its principles and in its relevancy to current pressing issues in the world's life. This work is intended equally, however, for those who are widely familiar with Niebuhr; it is a rescript of Niebuhr's thought that will freshen their interest through offering, along with a compendium of Niebuhr's teaching, an original and perceptive interpretation. To all readers who are conscious of living in a perplexed age, it will be a further merit of the book that it shows the practical force of Niebuhr's doctrine by tracing its outcome in positive attitudes on Communism, our technocratic culture, American foreign policy, and many other matters that are foremost in present public regard.

Our author is an admirer of Niebuhr and cordially sympathetic to his thought. This does not keep his presentation from being discriminating, even though one feels it would gain in strength if exposition and interpretation were more closely matched by analysis and critical appraisal. Niebuhr, after all, is not equally invulnerable on all fronts. Few would gainsay his essential purpose: "to clarify," in our author's words, "the insights and resources of

Christian faith in such a way that they may be savingly related to the structures, dynamics, and decisions of large social groups" (p. vii). Few would grudge him his conviction that "the resources of spirit derived from biblical faith are alone adequate to the strains of the struggle" for right communal and world relations (p. 212). But starting from this conviction he trusts his argument to a form of dialectic which many do find dubious. Its paradoxes become tiresome: God's purposes include and negate our causes; love fulfils and negates justice; the best as well as the worst in history is involved in rebellion against God; all virtue is tainted with evil. What does it matter, then, what we do, asks Niebuhr's critic, seeing that our good is certain to be negated, and evil to be permanent and pervasive? So runs the charge of pessimism against Niebuhr. Niebuhr answers with the opposite: realism regarding human capacity and historical possibility, so far from deterring social effort, furnishes it with the surest incentives in freeing it from illusions. He holds alike that all human behaviour is imperfect and that ethical differences are decisive. The critic nonetheless fears a blurring of these differences when they are set within an antithesis of the perfect and all else that is imperfect rather than on a scale of degrees. Another aspect of Niebuhr's teaching that has provoked question is his definition of *agape* as pure disinterestedness. Is this a conceivable principle? Niebuhr sees its one historical exemplification in the Cross with its disclosure of divine love as sheerly self-sacrificing. Yet the Cross was of God's own purpose, whose fulfilment he did not desire any less because his love for man was the fountain of it. Similarly, will not the Christian's love include himself, not for self-ends, but as one with the others for whom God intends his Kingdom? Sheerly disinterested love thus seems elusive or of that remote and abstract ideality against which Niebuhr inveighs in other contexts. Our concern just here is not to pronounce on these criticisms of Niebuhr, but simply to suggest that our author writes at a time when what could be a rising challenge to some of Niebuhr's positions demands more of *critical* justification of Niebuhr's premises than his work includes, in order to achieve a full validation of Niebuhr's generalizations regarding history and the norms of personal and social action.

Our own criticism of this book would centre here. The author defends Niebuhr against Stokes, Odegard, and others even less known, while Niebuhr's real measure comes from viewing him alongside thinkers of his own stature and world influence. In a work that aims to determine Niebuhr's place in ongoing Christian thinking, too little is done comprehensively on the differences between Niebuhr and Barth and Tillich—for example, their differing conceptions of being and individuality which, thought to their full consequence, reach to a level where the very nature of evangelical Christianity and biblical theology, and Christianity's cosmic setting and being, appear again as issues not yet resolved.

Nevertheless, for all these words of criticism, our initial judgment of this book remains unaltered. It opens access to Niebuhr for multitudes who

would be denied it if they had to master all that he has written; it serves farther in this way than, for example, the volume on Niebuhr in "The Library of Living Theology." Yet it does this without popularizing or "translating"; the writer weaves into his own style and diction enough of Niebuhr's idiom to certify to the reader the authentic teaching of one whose word to the churches, strong and prophetic, is still needed by them and is likely to be needed for long years to come.

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Shaping the Christian Message: Essays in Religious Education. Edited by G. S. SLOYAN. New York: The Macmillan Company (Toronto: Brett-Macmillan Ltd.), 1958. Pp. xi, 327. $5.50.

UNDER the editorship of Dr. Sloyan, head of the Department of Religious Education in the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., thirteen Roman Catholic educators have given answers to different aspects of the question: How are the young to be formed, and not merely instructed, in accordance with the living message of Jesus Christ? That they successfully set forth education as formation, rather than information, is all the more remarkable when one considers the book is basically a study of catechetics from biblical times to current practice.

"Catechesis" is given its rightful meaning as instruction, a term which, in the early Church, came to mean "either the act of teaching or the message taught" (p. 5). That early catechisms were prepared as a "doctrinal handbook prescribed by bishops as a guide to their clergy in providing a pulpit catechesis" (p. 3) makes clear that the early Church did not divorce teaching and preaching. However, "By the late third century 'catechesis' commonly described what was transmitted in the 'catechumenate' or sessions preparatory to baptism" (p. 5).

In the first essay Dr. Sloyan himself leaves no doubt of the emphasis to be maintained throughout the book. He shows how catechetics degenerated from a living witness to static formulations of doctrines and beliefs, the introduction of the question and answer method contributing to this degeneration. Up to medieval times catechesis was largely *analysis* of prayers, commandments, and sacred practices. "The great contribution of the 'new catechetics' has been synthesis: the setting into place of each dogma and moral demand in a framework of God's saving action in biblical times, made present to us in every age in joyful liturgical celebration" (p. 37).

In the late medieval period there was little formal instruction. Formation in the faith came from the influence of the home and "of a world imbued with a Christian spirit in every least detail" (p. 41). It was recognized that "the home must be the first school and the first church for tender youth" (p. 42). After the Council of Trent and the establishment of the Jesuits, however, catechetical instruction took on new force.

Following World War I, Roman Catholic religious instruction faced the same crisis as its Protestant counterpart. The trend was to more concrete concepts, active participation by the pupil, effort toward motivation, and adaptability to individual differences. It was seen that what was needed was not a theology, but news of salvation (p. 117). This news becomes contemporary by completing the historical catechesis with the liturgical catechesis (p. 118). The liturgy is seen as the living witness by which Christ is presented and as a most effective pedagogy (p. 118). This pedagogical function of the liturgy is one that demands more attention in Protestant circles, especially among those encouraging the revival of liturgical interest.

The Reverend François Coudreau, P.S.S., puts his finger upon two of the greatest difficulties in communicating the faith: in the nature of the case, the teacher must be a theologian and an adult, and both these qualifications create problems. In theology one advances from faith in the revealed data to reflective knowledge. In catechesis one proceeds from knowledge of the data to faith (pp. 136–7). Thus the theologian must reverse direction if he is to become an effective teacher. "The person catechized is not primarily in search of a better knowledge of revelation, but in search of an object for his faith, truth from God in which to believe, nourishment for life. . . . We are too exclusively devoted to transmitting knowledge when we should be devoted to educating in the service of faith" (p. 137). I would relate this to the training of ministers and ask: Dare we continue merely training our ministers in theological knowledge while shirking our responsibility for forming their life of faith? Until there is a change of perspective in seminary training, we shall continue to produce a plethora of amateur scholars and a paucity of men of God.

The adult frame of mind further hinders the catechist (teacher). He must move from adult concepts, reasoning, abstraction, deduction to the realm of the sensible, of the concrete, of induction and association. The implications of this are spelled out, with a clear distinction between coming to know religious facts in adult terms and growing to the commitments of faith at one's own level.

It is remarkable to find, under "Development of Catholic Doctrine and Education," that the major movements in the Roman communion are parallel to the stirrings within Protestantism. Growing emphasis on the Church as the mystical Body of Christ is similar to the stress being laid upon the Church as the community of faith. The tremendous thrust of an awakening laity and the interest in a liturgical revival both have their counterparts in Protestantism. However, it would appear that the Roman Church is much more effective in channelling, guiding, and training its laity than are those who theoretically assert the priesthood of all believers.

Claiming that the appropriate training of teachers presents the most difficult and serious challenge in the field of religious education today, the Reverend Johannes Hofinger, S.J., holds the sixty hours of training required of Catholic lay catechists to be inadequate. (How many Protestant Church

Schools are sensitive and responsible enough to require anything approaching this, if indeed anything at all?) He further indicates that new curricula are being developed to help lay catechists and advocates that a paid, professional lay function be established to provide sufficient numbers of adequately trained teachers. This is a controversial question in Protestantism. Christian Education leadership is being provided increasingly by professional lay workers. But strong feeling exists that a professional lay teaching function would rob Christian Education of its essential vitality in the consecrated, personal witness of the "volunteer."

The chapter by Canon F. H. Drinkwater on "The Use of Words: A Problem of Both Content and Method," is outstanding. Rightly observing that "we people who have studied theology and philosophy and what not are much too apt to take for granted that ordinary folk attach some meaning to abstract terms" (p. 267), he calls for speech that will reach not merely the mind but the heart, not just the emotions, but the will. He distinguishes four kinds of language: the scientific-difficult, the scientific-easy, the poetic-difficult, and the poetic-easy. Only the last has power to reach the heart.

The Reverend Georges Delcuve, S.J., has something to say to those who would divorce education from evangelism and mission. He sees the aim of religious education as leading to confirmation, while confirmation "confers on men an adult participation in the priestly, prophetic, and royal missions of Christ" (p. 306). Protestantism has suffered greatly from a type of evangelism which is set apart from education and produces little more than abortions, lacking the nurture which might have formed them, not merely for a decision of faith, but for the *life* of faith. A higher view of the Church and keener insight into how faith is formed would reveal the one objective governing education, evangelism, and mission.

There are naturally side-issues where a Protestant would differ from the Roman view, but these are surprisingly few and in no way detract from the contribution this book makes to the understanding of our task in religious education. In such practical concerns Protestant and Roman may be closer than either realizes. This book reveals a refreshing evangelical vitality in which we may all rejoice. One wishes that Protestant leadership might see its task and responsibility for religious education with such clarity, comprehensiveness, and imagination.

Albert E. Bailey

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